

SEMINARS ON ADVANCED METAPSYCHOLOGY

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Volume I: General

SEMINARS ON ADVANCED METAPSYCHOLOGY

This transcription of a series of seminars given in the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis in 1957 has been edited by Stuart C. Miller, M.D., with the assistance of John P. Plunkett, M.D., Roy Schafer, Ph.D., and Robert B. White, M.D. Together with David Rapaport, Ph.D., who led these seminars, and with Helen R. Gilmore, M.D., and Virginia Suttentfield, M.D., the numerous editors were participants in the seminars.

The syllabi and bibliographies prepared by Dr. Rapaport are reproduced as introductions to the sessions in which they are taken up. Though in several instances time did not allow discussion of all the syllabus-questions or of all the listed readings, the questions and bibliographies have been left unchanged.

Twelve seminars are here divided into four parts, by topics without regard to division by sessions. The four volumes, taking their titles from the syllabi, are as follows:

- Volume I: General
- Volume II: Self, Identification, Superego, Ego
- Volume III: Affects
- Volume IV: Reality

I. General

(A) Bibliography:

- (1) Bibring, E. "The Development and Problems of the Theory of the Instincts," Int. J. Psa., 22:102-131;1941.
- (2) Fenichel, O. "The Economics of Pseudologia Phantastica," Collected Papers, Second Series, New York, Norton, 1954, pp. 129-140.
- (3) Gill, M. "The Metapsychology of Regression," unpub. ms.
- (4) Gill, M., & Rapaport, D. "A Reconsideration of Psychoanalytic Metapsychology," unpub. ms.
- (5) Glover, E. Basic Mental Concepts, London, Imago, 1947.
- (6) Glover, E. Psychoanalysis, London, Staples, 1949, Chaps. II-V, pp. 22-94.
- (7) Hartmann, H. "Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of Instinctual Drives," Psa. Quart., 17:368-388;1948.
- (8) Kubie, L. "The Distortion of the Symbolic Process in Neurosis and Psychosis," J. Amer. Psa. Assoc., 1:59-86;1953.
- (9) Parche, F., & Renard, M. "The Reality of the Object and the Economic Point of View," Int. J. Psa., 37:282-289;1956.
- (10) Szasz, T. "On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Instincts," Psa. Quart., 21:25-48;1952.

(B) Major Problems:

- (1) What is the dynamic point of view and what concepts does it subsume, according to Glover and according to Gill-Rapaport?
- (2) What is the structural point of view and what concepts does it subsume, and how is it differentiated from the topographic point of view, according to Glover vs. Gill-Rapaport?
- (3) What is the economic point of view, and what concepts does it subsume, according to Glover vs. Gill-Rapaport?
- (4) What are the genetic and adaptive points of view, and what traces of these and of reality relations are found in Glover?
- (5) Gather the views of Glover and Gill-Rapaport on the autonomy vs. seething cauldron conceptions.
- (6) What are Glover's Basic Concepts and what is their theoretical position?

(C) Minor Problems:

- (1) The relation between content and metapsychological concepts in M. Klein, Glover and Fenichel (see also Fenichel, Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 113 ff.); cf. also Gill.
- (2) Does Szasz's treatment of death-instinct consider the entropy involved in the function of life instincts? Can a relation between drive-object and Schroedinger's "feeding on negative entropy" be construed with the help of Bibring's and Hartmann's papers? Cf. also Gill.
- (3) What metapsychological points of view are disregarded by Kubie's treatment of the symbolic process? Cf. also Gill.
- (4) How do Parche and Renard treat the economic and the structural point of view? Cf. also Gill.

- Rapaport: Who would like to start out with the statement of the dynamic point of view--of what it seems to be and then enter into the differences.
- Schafer: From the Gill-Rapaport discussion, the dynamic point of view is defined as a consideration of behavior from the standpoint of the psychological forces or tensions involved.
- Rapaport: Can we read the definition into the record?
- Suttenfield: The definition is on page 33 (Gill-Rapaport)
 "By the dynamic point of view of psychoanalytic meta-psychology we mean a consideration of behavior in regard to the psychological force or forces involved in it."
- Rapaport: Would anybody care to criticize the phrase that slipped into Roy's formulation?
- Schafer: I used the word "tensions."
- Rapaport: Why would you criticize it?
- Schafer: I think the concept tension is really more appropriate to economic discussions than dynamic, because it's an implication of energy-accumulation rather than--
- Rapaport: Besides that, I would have a more fundamental criticism. Anybody?
- White: Well, tension is used psychiatrically in a pedestrian way, as subjective experience. Psychodynamically--
- Rapaport: Yes. That is also a criticism. But there is a more fundamental criticism. Why not tension? How does that clash with the premises of this formulation in this paper? It clashes with an important point, which I would like to drive home. Ladies and gentlemen, the premises of these formulations are that they be empty formulations, that they not use any other terms but those which are included in the definition or postulatelike formulations. This is radically important: unless you have it as empty as possible, you have overlap. There is a possible overlap with the economic point of view if you introduce tension. This is a crucial point. What is lacking in meta-psychology are well-said definitions which are as empty as possible, as little overlapping as possible, and for which every term is defined either by a specific definition or by a postulation; by demanding that such and such be accepted. Really it is not important to criticize tension; it comes close to what is in the text. I am just using the point to drive home the crucial, formal, formalistic issue that is involved.

Now what would then immediately be implied in this formulation? What kind of considerations are immediately dynamic considerations? What are the basic concepts a dynamic formulation will deal with?

Plunkett: 1) That there are psychological forces.

Rapaport: That there are psychological forces. And what things about psychological forces come under the dynamic point of view?

Plunkett: "That these may either stand in isolation, or they may fuse, or they may cooperate, or conflict." (Gill-Rapaport, p. 36).

Rapaport: That's right. They may fuse, cooperate, conflict, or stand in isolation. But first of all, we are postulating that they exist, and under this point of view, whatever psychological phenomenon we deal with, we are going to ask the question: what forces are involved? We are assuming that there are always some--

Schafer: The second thing is not only that they exist, but that they are always determinants of behavior.

Rapaport: That they are always codeterminers of behavior. There are still further questions about whether they are the only ones or the ultimate ones. So far we have the double formulation that they exist and behavior always implies them, and therefore the dynamic point of view is applicable to the study of behavior without exception. The question emerges what kinds of forces these are, whether there is a single force or several forces in isolation or several forces in cooperation, several forces in conflict or in fusion.

Schafer: I don't see a clear difference between cooperation and fusion.

Rapaport: Because we do not know enough about them. Now let's suppose that you find that a behavior is overdetermined, by an oral wish as well as by an anal wish, and the forces corresponding to them we infer out of the wishes: there are such behaviors, aren't there? Could we mention one?

Schafer: Coprophagia.

Rapaport: Correct. Most primitively. There you wouldn't speak about a fusion of forces, would you? There may be a fusion also. But here is an overdetermination.

Schafer: Well, fusion is usually spoken of with particular reference to love and hate.

- Rapaport: Or in this context, to aggressive and libidinal forces.
- Schafer: But I still don't see clearly how one would spell out the difference there. In either case behavior occurs which can express both of the forces involved.
- Rapaport: I am afraid we are coming too close to clinical problems. I would be rather peremptory about it and say that in all situations where we speak about fusion, we make the assumption that there will be situations where ambivalent phenomena will be observed. Because a fusion is never stable, never without pathological diffusion also. Ambivalent features of the behavior in question will be observable under certain conditions, while no such assumption would necessarily be made concerning cooperations. But please, you understand that I am trying to keep out of this realm of discussion as much as I can. It is necessary to make the assumption, though Gill and I have been very cagey about it, as you probably notice, and not very certain whether fusion should be considered one of the examples of cooperation. Is that fair to say on reading the text? You must understand that the manuscript itself originates over a long period of several years, and something like $2\frac{1}{2}$ years have passed since it was last touched.
- White: There's another, more conceptual question, about fusion and defusion and neutralization and binding, that implied, in Glover's use, fusion of libidinal and aggressive instincts where the fusion neutralizes the aggressive components, which leads us into the neutralization issue. He uses neutralization half clinically and half conceptually.
- Rapaport: Systematically, what would be the response to that query?
- Plunkett: Well, one could start talking about neutralizations and bindings and so this is an economic proposition.
- Rapaport: According to some--
- Schafer: It will have to be approached from all 5 points of view; the neutralization issue implies all of those..
- Rapaport: That the neutralization issue implies several points of view is asserted. But in the main, primarily, it will be a question of the fate of cathexes. I would assert that primarily you would have to apply economic considerations which would lead you then to dynamic considerations also, because you would have to ask what the sources are and how the kind of energy used has been changed. From the phenomena to the energies we would come through dynamic questions. But primarily, in the center, there would be economic propositions, I would think.

Schafer: But later on in the paper you advanced a definition of economics which restricts it to just the quantitative considerations.

Rapaport: I am not sure that we have ever done that. And if we did it, it may be open to question. Would you read the definition into the record?

Schafer: "A consideration of behavior from the standpoint of the quantities of energies involved, and their increases and decreases." (Gill-Rapaport, p. 32)

Rapaport: Yes.

Plunkett: "All behavior disposes of energy either by damming it up or by discharging it or by transforming it, which is more than quantitative because it refers to discharge..." (Gill-Rapaport, p. 41)

Rapaport: Ladies and gentlemen, let's suppose that you are expecting to find a certain quantity of energy involved in a certain behavior, and this quantity of energy that you expected was of the sort that drove towards oral gratifications. You had reason to expect it, for instance, genetically, and you don't find it. It has decreased. It leads you to the problem of what happened, how was it decreased? So far it is an economic problem.

Or, when you take the Freudian formulation in The Ego and the Id, where neutralization was introduced, there suddenly another kind of energy is superadded. There is an increase, and yet you find that it is not of the same sort or origin as the energy you have been dealing with. Still there is an increase and this is centrally an economic problem; you deal with cathexes and with quantities. You deal with their increase and decrease in the main. The problem of its form changes will come in, though always when that comes in you are already dealing with forces, because only through the forces and their direction will you learn about the kind of energy involved and about the deployment and the direction of discharge possible for that energy. Am I making myself clear?

White: I would still have the question in mind that Jack talked about, of the qualitative transformations. It's not just a matter of quantitative interchange. You have a drive, and by the time the derivative impulse gets filtered through the various structures--

Rapaport: There you already have structural implications. You will have, as Roy started to say, dynamic implications. You already mentioned structural implications. We very well know that

neutralization is not conceived of except by some kind of structuralization. You also know, from our last seminar, that with every structure-formation new synthetic forces are born, and that indeed I myself would consider all fusion to imply a synthetic function of the ego at a certain level.

So as soon as we introduce fusion in particular into the first definition, we already involve several metapsychological principles. While this may all sound like hair-splitting, let me warn you that when you are dealing with any physical phenomena, you have to make allowances that you are observing them in a gravitational field and so in the earth's magnetic field. And it is possible that you are observing them in the gravitational field of the universe. It is not certain that the gravitational field of the universe is not responsible for what you observe as inertia on the earth. It is a question still unsettled in physics. Therefore though we arbitrarily separate these points of view, and then find that as soon as we come to a phenomenon all the other points of view will also be involved, the situation is not different from that obtaining in physics, nor one different from that obtaining in chemistry. Certainly not different from one obtaining in physiology, as you know. Am I making the point stick?

Schafer: Plunkett and I were discussing this on the way up. It's sort of a problem where you can't give a concrete example for any one of these points of view, because you can right away start saying yes, but that has reality in it or it has genetics in it or it has structure in it--there are no examples.

Rapaport: That is because these are the most abstract concepts psychoanalysis has developed. There is no example for the earth's gravitation. Even if you put your object into as well evacuated a field as you can produce, you can have only gravitation at this point of the earth. It changes from point to point. There are magnetic problems involved for the majority of the objects. You are accustomed to those examples that if you let a body fall it is gravitation. But if the body slides down, that's gravitation too, and if we are sitting here there is gravitation between us because we are bodies. This is the kind of thing that you have to keep in mind. These are the most abstract concepts. That's the point in the preamble to this whole paper.

White: I'd like to ask a question in regard to terminology in the basic definitions that are given in this paper. At no point has what you mean by behavior been defined, and in keeping with the principle of keeping the definitions as empty as possible, behavior should be broadly defined.

Rapaport: It is quite easily possible that behavior wasn't defined. Don't forget that you are seeing working notes. That should be on the record, and behavior should be defined for this purpose, as broadly as possible. Anything a human being does, anything that happens to a human being or within a human being.

White: So a dream, for instance, would be a behavior.

Rapaport: No doubt. And I am sure that in Organization and Pathology of Thought you will find that kind of definition of it.

When you make the definition you will obviously have to be careful, because you get into the somatic. And an ingrown toenail--there are limits to which you can push psychosomatics. This problem of behavior is sooner or later going to be quite a problem. All you can say is that nobody is wise enough to formulate this in a really empty formulation. Already you have found a hole in it. I wouldn't be surprised if you find more holes in it. One of the purposes of showing such a set of working notes is to show you that it ain't a holy of holies. There is much to be questioned about it; everybody makes mistakes about it, and we hope that some holes will be pointed out.

First, then, about the dynamic point of view--there exist forces, and they cooperate, fuse, clash, conflict, and can stand in isolation. This proposition has the most important dynamic consideration...which is it?

Schafer: They are instinctual?

Rapaport: That is implied, and what is implied in that? One of the most fought-over questions: what are they and how many? Who discovered what Glover thinks about that?

White: He begs the question. He says they are aggressive, but whether they are reactive or primary is---

Rapaport: He actually takes a stand. Which is it?

Schafer: He thinks there are two.

Rapaport: He actually will talk about the reactive instincts. Does anybody know the specific passage? ... Basic Mental Concepts, p. 12.
 "On many previous occasions I have suggested that this gap in our structural concepts can be bridged by adopting a nuclear theory of ego formation according to which psi systems associated with particular components of libidinal instincts and with the reactive aggressive instincts by which they are accompanied are synthesized in nuclear ego formations."

- Schafer: I think what Bob said applies to that. What can a reactive instinct mean except hedging?
- Rapaport: Except it means that he considers aggression a product of frustration.
- White: But how can it be an instinct?
- Rapaport: Just like component-instincts are. What are the component-instincts, according to him?
- White: Well, he gets into the whole zone business--
- Rapaport: Meaning that these are experiential developmental things to a great extent for him. Does the Gill-Rapaport manuscript imply a stand on the instincts?
- Plunkett: If it did, I didn't see it..
- Rapaport: I didn't either. It dodged the question, trying to show that metapsychologically we can get along without making such assumptions. Whether you can get along clinically is another question.
- Now let's just quickly review, of the guys you have read, who takes what stand?
- Schafer: Szasz takes the one-instinct theory.
- Rapaport: Definitely. With the corollary; how does he make one out of two? Who is his authority there?
- White: Fenichel certainly--
- Rapaport: Fenichel is definitely one, and how does he make one out of two?
- White: Frustration.
- Rapaport: Yes, frustration. But let's just see the difference--
- Schafer: The self-preservative instinct somehow remains in these discussions as providing the aggressive component...
- Rapaport: In whom?
- Schafer: I think it's in Bibring's.
- Rapaport: Bibring's tends to be characterized as one. By necessity he had to put all the aggressive instincts into the life-instinct group rather than into the death-instinct group. Automatically.

Anybody else who plays with the idea of relegating the aggressive instincts to the self-preservative category?

Schafer: Szasz does, doesn't he?

Rapaport: How does he make one out of two? And who is his authority? It's a crucial point. His authority is Ferenczi. Do you have the passages?

Plunkett: T. Szasz, "On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Instincts," pp. 37-38.

"The principle that frustration is a stimulus for development is not an original one. It has, however, not received the attention it deserves. Essentially the same idea was expressed by Ferenczi as early as 1913. In his classical paper, "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality," he stated--"

Rapaport: Do you people remember where in the history of psychoanalysis this paper belongs? What is it the sequel of?

Schafer: "The Two Principles."

Rapaport: It is an immediate sequel to "The Two Principles," an attempt to expound "The Two Principles" into a development of the sense of reality, development of the reality principle, and the corollary development of thinking. Please continue.

Plunkett: "In general, the development of the reality sense is represented by a succession of repressions, to which mankind was compelled, not through spontaneous 'strivings toward development' but through adjustment to a demanded renunciation. The first great repression is made necessary by the process of birth, which certainly comes about without active cooperation, without any 'intention' on the part of the child. The fetus would much rather remain undisturbed longer in the womb, but is cruelly turned into the world, and it has to forget (repress) the kinds of satisfaction it has got fond of, and adjust itself to new ones. The same cruel game is repeated with every new stage of development. If this thought is logically pursued, one must make oneself familiar with the idea of a tendency of preservation, or regression-tendency, also dominating organic life, the tendency to further development, adaptation, and so forth, depending only on external stimuli. It is apparent that Carrel's experiments fully substantiate Ferenczi's foregoing thoughts."

Rapaport: Okay. What comments on the Ferenczi-Szasz assumption? What kind of thinking does this frustration-assumption lead to? What is the central argument of Ferenczi? State it again.

Schafer: Development proceeds in conflict with the environment.

Rapaport: That is the creative principle and not--

Schafer: Not the ground-plan, which is part of your genetic definition.

Rapaport: It's very nice to bring it, as Roy does, in contrast with the most highly developed opposite view, namely the Erikson view. No development, but everything caused by frustration. What kind of general conception is that?

Plunkett: Conflict.

Rapaport: Further, please.

Schafer: It's a dynamic consideration.

Rapaport: Correct, but further. It is the conception of the seething cauldron. This is a consideration without any structural conception. A developmental conception is always a structural conception. I want you to see how we, with metapsychological guidelines, can see what is wrong with arguments that are made without any such guidelines.

The frustration-hypothesis, as it is carried through here, making one instinct out of two, is fraught with the difficulty that it has to renounce the whole structural theory. ... How does Fenichel avoid it? He calls it armadillo and avoids the problem, though he knows that the structural considerations are necessary.

In a similar way Hartmann avoids the like difficulties with the aggressive instinct. Postulating the aggressive instinct as a separate instinct would lead him to the difficulty of having to assume that in the undifferentiated phase, where there is no differentiation yet between id and ego, there is already a differentiation between aggression and libido. Now the only way to get away from it without facing the question is not to pay attention to this question, and proceed and analyze what aggression does. If you want to investigate it systematically, structural considerations come in immediately. Namely, the progressive differentiation of ego and id--only in the course of which can there be a differentiation of aggression and libido. How that differentiation takes place and how it can be traced clinically, we do not know. That leads people who judge mainly from the clinical end into difficulties. From the structural,

systematic, theoretical end, there is no such difficulty, because systematically if you postulate an undifferentiated phase out of which ego and id structurally arise, and if you postulate aggressive and libidinal instincts, this structural differentiation has to be the root of the structural differentiation of the two instincts. Clinically, it seems necessary to postulate two instincts, because we observe two rather disparate sets of behaviors.

Schafer: Do the two differentiations have to be linked?

Rapaport: Do they have to be linked? As long as you start with an undifferentiated phase they do.

Schafer: Yes, but that concept was developed with respect to just one aspect of development.

Rapaport: Which concept?

Schafer: The undifferentiated phase, with respect to ego-development.

Rapaport: But drives are the conceptual content of the id. Therefore if the differentiation is between ego and id, the referents of the specific conceptual contents of the id would have to go with this differentiation. If the id differentiates only late, and if you attribute to it the conceptual contents drives, these drives also have to differentiate progressively.

This is not the important point. The point is that a frustration-hypothesis, consistently carried through, is going to do away with maturation, with an inborn plan of the organism's development and will make that an environmental issue; that we are not monstrosities in excess or in deficit is due to environmental conditions. That isn't so. This disregards the maturational issue, and the maturational issue is always structural.

White: But the maturational issue is structural-environment; environmental stimuli are necessary ingredients for the progression of the maturational process.

Rapaport: Oh yes. But of that maturational process, not of its generality. Any maturational step, whether it will be solved this way or that way, depends on environmental conditions, for example, whether the problem of anal training will result in an excessive preoccupation with anal contents and anything related, or not.

Schafer: I think Bob is raising a more biological issue, that there is no maturation except in relation to an environment. Although in this case it's not a frustrating environment but actually a

life-supporting environment which allows the maturation to proceed.

Rapaport: But you understand, what kind of hands a person will have depends both on genes and on intrauterine and extrauterine environmental conditions. That's correct. But hands he's got to have, and if he hasn't got hands he will be not a new creature but a handless creature. Hands are in the life-plan, structurally.

White: But conscience is not in the life-plan.

Rapaport: If you accept Erikson's assumptions concerning that, then you have it structurally in the life-plan. As a matter of fact, even if you accept the Freudian assumptions concerning latency, it belongs to the life-plan and not to the environmental conditions.

White: But that life-plan is in a social structure. I got interested in this the other night and looked up the feral children business,* and it seems to me that that's a natural experiment that might be useful in studying this problem.

Rapaport: To be sure. But the question still remains, feral children or no feral children, whether within the average expectable environment there is a life-plan which is going to be realized within certain limits. --In an intrauterine measles environment, the high average expectation is that you are not going to get the same kind of child as in a normal environment. However, the measles environment is not the average expectable environment excepting when it is endemic. One could go to the malarial problems, where one could very well demonstrate that where the average expectable environment includes endemic malaria, there will be a mutational and selective adjustment. Again, however, the product will be a human being much like us, because that's the life-plan. It will be not a very different human being, because the very different ones are predicated on gene-changes and selection which is lethal. Only a certain selection of genes gives a human being. Are you following the relevance of this point? Sure environment can do terrible things, but only within a certain limit. Beyond that limit it is going to be either psychosis or lethal in some other fashion. You can't disregard the life-plan as laid down structurally.

This paper of Szasz's wouldn't be worth argument if he didn't bring up several good illustrations that show that mutuality-guarantees, the phase-specific problems of autonomy, initiative,

*Gesell, A. Wolf Child and Human Child, New York, Harper, 1940.

etc., are structural givens which follow one another in a sequence as specific problems of specific phases of psychological maturation. This was disregarded by Ferenczi, and, in his way, by Szasz too. These are structural issues, and our knowledge of those metapsychological structural issues makes it possible for us to see the anatomy of the frustration-hypothesis as it is dished up here.

In another sense we know that the frustration-hypothesis is a significant hypothesis. We know very well that the deployment of counter-cathexis, and thereby the complication and elaboration of the hierarchy of structures, is enhanced only when the drive-object is not always present. This is a very different frustration-hypothesis, however. Thresholds are being enhanced, not new thresholds being created with the whole human being made out of frustration. This is the difference between them.

Plunkett: These are your structural givens.

Rapaport: Right. The structural givens around which the frustration can work. If a new drive is to be created by this means, there cannot be structures yet, and all this structural business has to be disregarded when frustration is used to create a new drive, not to differentiate drives.

This then is the metapsychological anatomy of this argument. It is what I am trying to drive home, in order to show that here is a usefulness to this abstruse and abstract stuff, because with it you can judge what's wrong with these fellows.

We have to go back to Glover, because that's real meat: that's a man who thought, and he knows his stuff. He knows the references you had to know, quite aside from what he makes of them. We have to see where and why he goes to the point he goes to. It is not settled that Gill and Rapaport are right in putting this thing together; maybe Glover is right.

So far we have simply enumerated some of the things that come under the dynamic point of view. We dwelt for a little on the instinct theory, one of the cardinal things which comes under this point of view. We are not exhausting it, partly because we would immediately get into the other things. As you notice, already this discussion of how many instincts there are leads into all kinds of structural, developmental, and genetic problems, etc. Now we abandon further arguments on this, and I would like to turn to Glover's discussion of dynamics. What is the statement concerning energy?

White: Glover, Psychoanalysis, page 92:
 "Dynamically speaking, the most important factor is that of mobility of cathexis."

- Rapaport: What does the concept "mobility of cathexis" define metapsychologically?
- Schafer: Primary process.
- Rapaport: Primary process! Further; the most simple principle involved is--?
- Plunkett: The pleasure principle.
- Rapaport: Obviously! The mobility of cathexis is defined for us in metapsychology as the pleasure principle! The cathexes are not held up, no delay is applied, but immediate discharge is striven toward. Does Glover mean to tell you that, or did you read in his dynamics chapter something a little different? Did you get the spirit in which he treated the mobility of cathexis?
- Suttenfield: As I understood it, what he says is that the cathexis can be withdrawn, and with certain instincts more easily withdrawn than with others.
- Rapaport: Yes, partly. But he goes beyond that. ...
- Schafer: It is linked with genetic considerations.
- Rapaport: To be sure, one of the characteristic things for this clinician is that whatever he talks about, he mixes in genetics. But throughout this dynamic chapter, what is happening? In this chapter he indicates that an instinctual force may find its expression now here in this form, now there in another form. It is characteristic of him that he dwells on this as the central characteristic of psychoanalytic thinking. Can somebody find a good quotation to show this?
- Schafer: Psychoanalysis, p. 79:
 "Freud also held that, prior to the development of repression, these influences manifest themselves in certain primal vicissitudes of instinct. An instinct can undergo reversal into its opposite, and reflection on the subject,--"
- Rapaport: It is a good example, but a highly specific one. I'm sorry that I don't have mine... Throughout here the steady keynote is that energy is redirected now this way, now that way, and this is what he is trying to cover with the mobility-concept. Is that a mobility-concept from our point of view?
- Schafer: It's a dynamic concept, you mean?
- Rapaport: That's right. It's a dynamic concept.

- Plunkett: The mobility-concept as we use it is an economic concept.
- Rapaport: And this issue itself is an economic issue, from our point of view.
- Plunkett: What's confusing to me is that Glover seems to be talking in the dynamic point of view about things that I think of under economics, and under economics he's talking about dynamics--
- Rapaport: This is really the point. The basic concepts under dynamic aspects of the mind are all based to some extent on the concept of psychic energy. It's already in the introduction, page 33, of the chapter on the dynamic aspects of the mind (Psychoanalysis).
- Plunkett: Mobility of energy and discharge of energy are what he is talking about.
- Rapaport: Those are down on that same page (Psychoanalysis, p. 33):
 "Instincts are most easily thought of in terms of flow or rise and fall of energy."
 It is thus that the mobility concept is introduced, which would be the pleasure principle, except that mobility for him does not mean simply the pleasure principle, but the protean forms of manifestation of instinctual force, which we know we need economics to evaluate.
- Another quotation which shows you the same kind of thing is in Basic Mental Concepts, p. 11:
 "You can say further that this concept of primary dynamic function should regulate our theories of mental economy from birth to the period--"
 etc. That is to say, the type of definition the Gill-Rapaport manuscript gives of economics is subsumed here in the Glover treatment under dynamics, to be sure, together with many of the things which we would consider dynamics also.
- By the way, affects are treated under dynamics too. As you know, affects are a complex phenomenon, which should be treated under all points of view, but centrally they are what, at least in their primitive manifestations?
- Plunkett: Discharge-phenomena.
- Rapaport: Discharge of what?
- Plunkett: Of energy, of cathexes, and this is an economic--
- Rapaport: Amounts; so the more ancient the forms of affect that are taken into consideration, the more the economic point of view will be decisive in the treatment of them. Now throughout, affects

are treated here as dynamics. Let's have the crucial references, just for the record.

- Plunkett: Psychoanalysis, p. 50:
"Affect is the true dynamic derivative of instinct."
- Rapaport: How about another reference which is crucial?
- Schafer: Psychoanalysis, p. 43:
"Active instincts manifest themselves in three ways: through affective experiences, through mental images and ideations, and through verbal and actual behavior."
- Rapaport: Right. I would like to bring to your attention that this man does not misrecognize what affects are about. In Psychoanalysis, on p. 45, you find:
"And if, as seem probable, Freud's further suggestion proves to be accurate, namely that different kinds of affect are induced by different quantities of the same instinct..."
So he is keenly aware of what the theory is about. I would like also to indicate to you that he is keenly aware that conflict has to be in this section, as he indicates on p. 43. He is keenly aware that the fusion or cooperation issue belongs here, as you will find on pp. 40-43 and 45. In addition, you will find that in his treatment of narcissism he also correctly assesses that.
- Schafer: The overlap with the economic point of view is strongly implied in his basic distinction of two types of affects, of tension and discharge-affects, which certainly links it to economic considerations.
- Rapaport: And to structural ones too.

Let us go on to the structural point of view. What is the structural point of view according to Gill-Rapaport?
- White: P. 33:
"By the structural point of view of psychoanalytic metapsychology we mean a consideration of behavior in regard to the enduring forms of organization (referred to as psychic structures) involved in it."
- Rapaport: First of all, before we turn to Glover, what major concepts come under this then?
- White: Well, id, ego, superego, are the fundamental tripartite.

- Rapaport: It implies, as Dr. White points out, the major structural subdivisions id, ego, and superego. What else does it imply?
- Schafer: Mental mechanisms, automatism, the archaic affect-apparatus, and affect-signals.
- Rapaport: The defensive and controlling structures it implies, and those structures which are permanent equipment used in thinking and communication. What else is implied?
- White: That all structures have an economic aspect in that they function to conserve energy-expenditure.
- Rapaport: That is already a combination with the economic point of view. Remember, we are trying to keep it as empty as possible. The mechanisms Roy mentioned already lead to that question, and it is quite a problem, as you will see later when you come to the economic point of view according to Glover. Let's first of all see what Glover considers to be basic to the structural point of view. Can somebody jump the gun and say simply and directly what he considers basic to structure?
- Schafer: Memory-trace and the organization of it.
- Rapaport: The organization of memory-trace and in particular--?
- White: Conscious, unconscious, preconscious.
- Plunkett: He considers the memory-trace, but ignores the fact of the apparatus for laying down the memory-trace.
- Rapaport: That's correct too, but please, he attributes a crucial, central role to the verbal trace. We will have to see later why he does so. For the moment, it is correct that this is central to structure, as he talks about it. First we will have to see just a little bit why Glover does attribute a central role to the verbal trace. Somebody started on conscious, preconscious, and unconscious--didn't you, Dr. White? What does Glover say about that?
- Plunkett: He treats these as psychic systems, treats these as basic concepts. He treats these three as structure in themselves.
- Rapaport: The quote for that, please?
- Suttenfield: Psychoanalysis, p. 52:
 "As has been suggested, earlier concepts of psychic structure were essentially descriptive and expressed in terms of consciousness (awareness). Their practical value was greatly diminished by the fact

that observers were themselves convinced that mind and consciousness were coterminous. Freud was able to demonstrate that mental products exist of which the subject is totally unaware, exist that is to say, 'apart' from consciousness. Only then was it possible to maintain that consciousness is one of the functions of mind, or in structural terms that it is a psychic system, a part of the total instrument or mental apparatus."

Rapaport: Now, can somebody state further what relationship he predicates between unconscious, preconscious, and conscious on the one hand, and id, ego, superego on the other?

Schafer: It's on p. 10 of Basic Mental Concepts:
 "To return to the problem of reconstruction, I am convinced that one of the main causes of undisciplined reconstruction is neglect by the observer of Freud's original metapsychology, that is, his description of the mental apparatus in terms of the systems unconscious, preconscious, and perceptual-conscious, and the too exclusive concern with his later description of the mind in terms of ego relations and institutions. It is true that in the course of time Freud found himself compelled to clarify the relations of the unconscious ego to instinct, to the repressed, and to reality testing, and so developed his tripartite system of id, ego, and superego. But there was no intention on his part that this later system of structural differentiation should supercede his earlier formulations regarding the function of the mental apparatus."

Rapaport: Is this statement of Glover's correct?

Schafer & Plunkett: No.

Rapaport: Why not? What does the record tell about it?

Schafer: Freud later specifically says that these are to be regarded as mental qualities.

Rapaport: Where does he say that?

Schafer: In the Outline.

Rapaport: In the Outline, obviously. P. 38:
 "Thus we have attributed three qualities to mental processes: they are either conscious, preconscious, or unconscious."*

*See also Gill-Rapaport, p. 22, for discussion of this point.

Does it begin to dawn on anybody yet why he has to do it this way? Or anybody who can quote Kubie to the same effect?

Schafer: Glover's basic definition in terms of the memory-traces and their organization forces this on him.

Rapaport: Yes. But what forced him to make the memory-trace so central to structure? Why does he need this, a man who knows this much? Does it dawn on you yet? If it doesn't, let's bypass it. Sooner or later it will be clear to you.

White: This has to do with his concern with the problem of reconstructions about early ego-stages, with which he deals at considerable length on p. 12 of Basic Mental Concepts:

"But the distinctions between embryonic stages of mechanisms and their final organized phase cannot be established on a time factor alone, useful as that is in enabling us to check the phases of development. We are therefore compelled to adopt a structural approach to the problem. This is, incidentally, the most rigid of all metapsychological approaches, and consequently the one most liable to give rise to errors in psychic reconstructions. But first of all we must establish some transitional forms of concepts that bridge the gap between basic ideas of structure, that is, the development of systems of memory traces, Freud's psi systems, and the concept of the ego. Above all, we must get rid of the confusing term of primitive ego, with its implications of unified structure."

And he then proposes that his nuclear theory of ego-formation, according to which psi systems associated with particular components of libidinal instincts--

Rapaport: Wait a moment, don't jump the gun. Because here he says clearly, in the continuation of this on page 13 (Basic Mental Concepts), something that's important for us.

"In this connection, two points should be noted. First that all these terms, although derived from and essential to the structural approach, are not in the same category as basic concepts."

These terms are those of ego and structure. Do you see what Glover's intent with basic concepts is?

White: To kill Melanie Klein.

Rapaport: Obviously! That's the point. I was trying to show you where his mistakes come. In his attempt to show something about Melanie Klein which is crucial, correct, and essential, he doesn't have the conceptual equipment, so he develops basic concepts and says to

us a hundred times that without these basic concepts we can't have understanding. He says the same thing as we say about the basic metapsychological concepts. That's why Glover becomes one of the men who really is concerned with metapsychology. Only I would judge he constructs it as he sees it, in a battle, instead of dispassionately, slowly piling up the evidence, sifting it, and clarifying what Freud's metapsychology was.

White: He's not working with neutralized aggressive cathexes.

Rapaport: You could put it that way. Please understand, I am not simply trying to dish up the dirt. I would like to show you what the essential connections are between his putting all the economics into the dynamics, making the structural point in the main a memorial and verbal point, and linking it to the early topographic thing, instead of recognizing that those topographic things yielded partly to the structural point and partly became purely qualities. And I hope you will see why he did to the economic point of view what he did, and how, with these means, he tried to point up something that is fundamentally correct. Now we will have to see what he pointed up about Melanie, because without that we won't see the point. We will have to see why this serious attempt at metapsychology backfires, shoots too far, disregards much. This is really my purpose. I am trying to show you that my purpose is not only to get you the metapsychological framework, because for that alone I could have relied purely on the further documentation from Freud of what Gill and I did. I wanted you to see that from another point of view, because it is not certain that Glover doesn't have a number of important things here, even though we may not get to them. We may not get to questioning several of the points of metapsychology, but it is not certain, and I wanted you to see that it is not.

Before we go on, let's have for the record first of all the central role of the memory-trace.

White: Basic Mental Concepts, p. 2:
"In other words the activity of mind in the earliest stages can best be described in terms of movement of changes of energy and variations in affect. For although the memory trace is a basis of mental structure, it is not possible to speak at this period of ego-organization or to go beyond the concept of systems of memory traces."

Rapaport: Very good. Let's have the others, please.

Plunkett: Psychoanalysis, p. 54:
"Freud's earlier outline of his theory of mind did

not claim to describe psychic structure in a way that was capable of satisfactory diagrammatic representation. At best, psychoanalytic diagrams are merely aids to presentation; it would be unreasonable to expect otherwise. Nevertheless it dealt with basic concepts of mental structure, and following the physiological pattern of the reflex arc, described the sequence of mental events in a way which suggested the functioning of the central mental apparatus. Perhaps the best example of the basic concept is that of the memory trace."

Rapaport: Does anybody know the crucial sentence on p. 55?

Plunkett: "Theoretically regarded, the ego is simply the total organization of memory traces."

Rapaport: Correct. Any other outstanding point on this?

Schafer: The point about synthesis at the bottom of p. 54 seems to me to involve a basic concept which he doesn't mention anywhere else, which is the tendency toward synthesis. This is something that is one of the givens.

Rapaport: Concerning memory, and pertaining here to the memory-trace.

Schafer: And the evolution of psychic structure.

Rapaport: Would you put it into the record, please?

Schafer: Psychoanalysis, p. 54:

"All these early formations are influenced by a tendency of the mental apparatus toward synthesis; memory-traces are organized into images and, in accordance with the instinct or experience involved, are later developed into systems of images. At this point we can link theory with clinical observation. As we have seen, from the time when it is possible to apply the techniques of psychoanalysis, the mind is found to be already divided into three great systems, the unconscious, the preconscious, and what we now call perceptual consciousness. Retracing our steps from the clinical to the theoretical we can regard the unconscious and preconscious systems as built up from lesser and more scattered systems, which can be traced back to the formation of primitive memory traces. Of the two systems the preconscious is immeasurably the more synthesised."

Rapaport: Very good. Do you want to have down the verbal business?

Gilmore: In Basic Mental Concepts, on p. 14:

"We may hazard the guess that organization of the ego cannot take place so long as the mind is mainly governed by primary processes, that is to say, before the organization of speech and the elaboration of the pre-conscious system."

Rapaport: Yes. This is one of the final formulations in which the role of speech is brought in. How about the role of the verbal trace itself? In Basic Mental Concepts, p. 8:

"The existence of a preconscious system depends on the development of word presentations as distinct from thing presentations. By drawing this fundamental distinction, Freud provided us with...a fixed point in time from which we could operate either forward or backwards. This fixed point is the organization of auditory impressions which loosens the power of speech. For although it is reasonable to suppose that the meaning of words is apprehended before the use of words is effective it is equally reasonable to suppose that effective organization of the preconscious takes place after speech is developed, and when secondary processes begin to bind or at any rate to slow down the more mobile energies and cathexes of the unconscious."

You see how the secondary process is linked to the verbal trace, just as in the early Freud, without change. Is this clear? Do you want to take also p. 71 in Psychoanalysis?

Schafer: The discussion of primary repression?

"In view of the fact that actual repression occurs at the frontier between the unconscious and the preconscious systems, and that the organization of the preconscious is built up, for the most part, on verbal (word) representations, it is obvious that this mechanism can not develop until the preconscious is definitely organized and this gives us some idea at least of the earliest possible date at which actual repression can operate effectively, namely, some time after verbal representation of experiences, that is, speech, has been sufficiently developed to enable the meaning of thought to be expressed in thought."

Rapaport: You see, then, that the ego-organization actually is linked to verbal traces by Glover. You can also see that if one argues against arbitrary misuse of early ego-organization--such misuse as Melanie Klein's--he has the interest to postpone the beginning

of ego-organization to as late a time as possible. Therefore, only ego-nuclei exist in the early stages. Around what are the ego-nuclei organized, according to Glover?

Gilmore: The libidinal phases of development he talks about--

Rapaport: That's right. Around libidinal phases. Therefore, what kind of ego-theory is that?

White: Libido-ego theory.

Rapaport: A libidinal ego-theory, not a structural ego-theory. Is anybody in the position to point out where he has some trace of structural ego-theory?

Schafer: Yes, I found a number of those. For instance, in his "Embryology of the Mind" in Psychoanalysis, p. 22, he refers to constitutional factors, such as the capacity to tolerate frustration, and also to find substitute-gratification, something which distinguishes man from other animals, which seems to me to be related to the states of adaptedness and to thresholds.

Rapaport: Meaning that already structural features are seen, but they are not generalized into a structural theory as the structural roots of the ego. Rather, they are kept separate, and the ego is derived only out of nuclei organized, Abraham-like, around the partial drives, and libido-development in general. This emphasis is necessary in order to show that Melanie Klein departed radically from the original course. It's a retrogressive defense against Melanie Klein. Our way of defending against Melanie Klein is to say that the ego has an organization, only it is different from the way Melanie imagines it. Who sees the other points on pp. 25-26 in Basic Mental Concepts? First, the structural points.

Plunkett: Basic Mental Concepts, p. 25:

"When one contrasts an 'unorganized' with an 'organized' phase, the reader may get the impression that no vestige of organization exists in the 'unorganized' stage. He may think, for example, that in the outline given above the existence of structural elements in the primary dynamic phase has been too heavily discounted. This is far from being the case. No doubt mental development sometimes proceeds by fits and starts and at times appears to double on its tracks. Nevertheless it does proceed. It proceeds from the simple to the more complex and, taking it all over, it proceeds gradually. Every stage before the final one is transitional. It would be positively inaccurate to suggest that during the dynamic phase there is no

ego-development or for that matter no superego development.

Schafer: But he takes that back in the next sentence---

Rapaport: To be sure, but we have to look further. This is Basic Mental Concepts, p. 26:

"Moreover a part of the narcissistic organization that is built up during primary identification is destined later to rate as a part of the ego, and another part to rate as a part of the superego. In this sense we can talk of the superego as having autogenous elements."

You see now, he took back that taking-back again; he fluctuates that way. Do you know the other point he makes about narcissism which is quite important in this same structural respect? (I am using narcissism only as an external link here.)

White: Psychoanalysis, p. 40:

"To sum up, narcissism, as distinct from autoeroticism which is a form of sexual gratification, is a stage of organization of the ego."

Rapaport: The point is that narcissism cannot be considered simply as a libido-organizational phase. Narcissism is the libido-theoretical equivalent of what we now call the undifferentiated phase. This is not an ego-nucleus either; it's an ego-organization, a state of organization of the ego.

Schafer: But the next sentence says that he doesn't mean it that way.

Rapaport: All right, read the next sentence now.

Schafer: Psychoanalysis, p. 40:

"Difficulty in distinguishing between the terms is due to confusing the energies of narcissism, which is certainly libidinal, with the earliest object of the energies which is a primitive ego form."

So I think he means it again in the sense that we discussed before, that it's a libidinal state which may later on have something to do with structure, but it doesn't have anything to do with apparatuses or thresholds or...

Rapaport: Yes, you can interpret it that way. Yet it is clear from what we see here before us that the man is considering not only the specific developmental phases of libido, but that general narcissistic issue which is the conundrum of classic theory. From the point of view of libidinal development there is no place for it; there is only an autoerotic phase. Here he

explicitly states, whatever he takes back in the next sentence, that in contrast to autoeroticism there is a narcissism which is an ego-organization. So I am just trying to show you that he knows structural things, not that he made a theory that he didn't make. I am just trying to do justice insofar as it is possible.

Now, how about the whole issue of identification, which is crucial from the structural point of view? How about p. 26 of Psycho-analysis?

"...he now reacts as if these objects were part of himself or, to use purely psychical terminology, part of his mind or ego (see introjection and identification).

"It is a kind of radical 'make-believe'... Nevertheless it produces a profound and permanent change in the child's mind."

Permanent. This is enduring form of organization.

"And this for two reasons. The more he succeeds in taking in the object of any given instinct into his own ego, the more capable he is of abandoning the object of the particular instinct. Expressed in dynamic rather than topographic terms, he becomes capable of abandoning the particular instinct that is directed at the original object."

You notice that he does not treat it really in structural terms, but he does have the structural point that it is an enduring change, a permanent change.

Schafer: It seems to me maybe one should ask here, as a precursor of this point, about the building up of imagos. This is in his development of memory-trace to organization of memories to the imagos, because they would precede the identification-process.

Rapaport: For what purpose of his would they precede the identification-process? In order to be able to say to Melanie Klein that all those introjections and identifications that she talks of in the first half-year of life are impossible, because that is the period of building up of imagos.

From the point of view of us who try to generalize introjection to the broader concept of building up an internal world--I am quoting the Hartmann phrase--the way to cope with the Melanie Klein problem is not to try to make this sharp differentiation, but rather to show that identification is one special major form of building up the internal world, and to show that it has its predecessors from the beginning on and that it makes no sense to try to talk about the later forms before the earlier forms. The same thing Glover is trying to achieve can be achieved with metapsychological means, provided that structural formation and

the establishment of the internal world are considered one process, and provided a real structural point of view is applied from the first.

I am referring to what he says on p. 26 (Psychoanalysis) where the whole issue is a question of abandoning a particular instinct. With every abandonment of a particular instinct-object, apparently there is a structure established. A part of the internal world is established. We don't have to dichotomize in order to prove to Melanie Klein that the whole world with all that complexity she supposes is not established all at once. We don't have to separate imago-formation from introjections, or make all the more complex processes dependent on prior consolidation of the verbal traces.

- Schafer: This may be off the point, but my understanding is that in more recent years Klein has relied much more on inborn imagos to account for her phenomena. While these objections would be cogent if she said that all of this developed after the child was born, they don't meet her position that it's necessary to assume that there is a hereditarily determined Oedipus complex in the first 6 months of life.
- Rapaport: In that case, the whole development would be compressed into the first 6 months, with the assistance of very detailed inborn givens. Which arguments, in what of the papers that you have read for this session, would effectively combat this assumption of a high degree of preformation?
- Schafer: Kubie does, in a way.
- Rapaport: With a sleight of hand, repeating the Glover argument. I mean, no reflection on Kubie or Glover, you understand. These are theoretical matters. Hartmann demonstrated, insofar as demonstration is necessary, that the adaptation-job is the job of what in the animal?
- Schafer: Instincts.
- Rapaport: Instincts. While man's instincts have, to a great extent, yielded the job to what?
- Schafer: To the ego.
- Rapaport: ...yielded the job to the ego. Our general understanding of the genetics--genetics now not in the metapsychological sense, but in the sense of evolution theory--our understanding of the genetics of human behavior makes no sense unless we realize that to a great extent in man's development the inborn coordinations have weakened. The direct observation of childhood which makes

this assumption (cf Hartmann's) necessary is the long period of helplessness in man's infancy, the longest that any creature has. That demonstrates ad oculos that the adaptedness with which the lower animal is born, guaranteed by his instincts, is nonexistent in man. Any theory that presupposes that man is born with a detailed plan already fully formed flies into the face of this fact of the prolonged period of adaptation. Man is born with a primary adaptedness that does not go beyond those mutual-ity-signals which make it possible to obtain the help which allows him to survive in the state of helplessness.

Now what about the topography issue?

- Plunkett: On p. 22 of the Gill-Rapaport paper--
Up until the Outline, Freud regarded quality as being that which is necessary for something to become conscious. In the Outline, he refers to conscious, preconscious, unconscious as qualities." It goes on to raise the question whether he is using quality in these two places in a different manner, and answers it thus:
"Quality in the Outline is used, unlike in the earlier places, in the common-sense way. He is saying that conscious, preconscious and unconscious are not systems in the sense in which they have been previously used, and are not structures in the newer sense. There are structures now defined to which these terms in the sense of systems previously referred, but they are not congruent with Ucs, Pcs and Cs. The latter do not differ from each other as systems or structures, but are rather 'qualitatively' different from each other. The term quality is here general and not equivalent to 'psychological quality.'"
- Rapaport: But what happens when the structural conception is introduced? What happens to topography?
- Schafer: The treatment of it in The Interpretation of Dreams remains, in the reflex-arc concept, in the perceptual and motor ends of the psychic apparatus. It's a different kind of topography, but that still remains; Freud didn't abandon that.
- White: But isn't the point that the topographically located position--the position of the amount of energy, in topographical terms--Ucs, Pcs, or Cs--is now used as being determined by the ego and its repressive function?
- Rapaport: In its defensive functions. Has the boundary between Pcs and Ucs on the one hand, and Cs on the other, changed with the introduction of the structural conception? Or has it not?
- White: It hasn't.

Rapaport: But far from being the system Cs's job, maintaining that boundary becomes the job of the defensive and controlling functions of the ego.

Where did Freud first speak about economic conditions as the determiners of the fate of an idea, the fate of representation of affect, rather than dealing with it in terms of the topographic location? It was in "The Unconscious." Remember, he starts out trying to discuss the idea that when somebody has a repressed memory and you get it from him in hypnosis, and he doesn't remember it and you tell it to him, then does he now have two traces of it or one? He then talks about the localities of these traces. From there he proceeds to prove that it cannot be a matter of locality, but it is a matter of cathexis.

Why do I ride this? Because--Glover to the contrary notwithstanding--the topographic conception before The Ego and the Id topography was already overruled by economy. And Dr. White is right; when the system of topography yielded to the structural conception, one line remained intact. That was the line between quality conscious and quality not conscious, which may be Pcs and Ucs. Only, instead of a presumptive system Cs holding that line, that was relegated to the ego, and its defensive and controlling structures. The Pcs and the Ucs underwent quite a radical upheaval, because, as you know, super-ego, id, and ego partake in all of these, excepting in consciousness. Nor can one agree with Freud simply that all of these became purely qualities. In some respects they became qualities; in other respects, as in the Seventh Chapter, consciousness was not only a system Cs but was also a superordinate sensory apparatus which it remained in this new structural theory. It is a substructure of the ego, with characteristics of its own.

Schafer: Your point about what remains as the line between the Cs, Pcs, and Ucs--even that is modified, in the sense that we think of degrees to which this is true, which leads again into economic considerations. There are fluid transitions between these qualities that used to be systems.

Rapaport: Yes, we would assume that there are fluid transitions. That's a matter of definition. For instance, you could define everything that in any way becomes conscious as conscious, and subject to the system of consciousness. Or else you could say that you will define as conscious only that which permanently can be held. This is obviously a complex question, but it is a matter of definition; and which definition is the better one, I do not know yet. It is quite possible that we will have to go at it in both ways, because while consciousness can be defined as a superordinate sensory apparatus, it is also defined as a subjective quality of experience. I would imagine that anybody who

assiduously pursues the lines that Kris drew up in that respect, partly in that paper "On Preconscious Mental Processes," partly others, will be in a position to make such formulations, and make them stick.

I would still like to pin down one more thing here on structure. We started on introjection, and we tried to show that brother Glover follows structure-formation and sees what psychoanalysis knows about structure-formation. I would like to show you now where he doesn't see it. P. 15 of Basic Mental Concepts:

"At this point we can define what Freud called primary identification. This is less a basic concept than a reconstruction; or rather it is less a mechanism than a state of mind."

You notice, we don't know what a state of mind is, unless for "state of mind" we read "a characteristic of the ego."

White: Doesn't a state of mind relate to the state of mind of the observer? Doesn't it represent what the observer thinks?

Rapaport: It's possible; I may be making a mistake. Obviously this is again an attack on Melanie, denying any objective role to primary identification and early identifications. Now we are in the position, theoretically, to have to consider identifications as occurring from the earliest on. For instance, the significance of the absent drive-object, and the ensuing counterathesis which heightens the threshold for the discharge of that drive--that process is to our minds a primitive form of identification. It reinstates the absent object inside.

Schafer: You could come at that from another point, I think, from the standpoint of the assumption of the hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, which would be the primary model of the cathected memory-trace, as part of the beginning structure too.

Rapaport: That's the end on which Glover attacks it, obviously. You must understand that it is possible that all that Melanie Klein is getting at--and why she talks about these first introjections--is the simple fact that when you have a drive counteratheted, that counterathesis is a reinstatement of the nonexisting object in the internal world. Now if this is to be expressed in a fantasy-language later, it may appear as the bad object that doesn't give. That is a reconstruction indeed in the mind of the observer, and if you take that for a bad object, you can build up a mythology around it. Then if you force the patient or the subject to work with that, which should be a metapsychological concept--because it isn't an experience, it's just the basis of later experience--then you are on the skids.

You see how this simple point of counteratheses being piled up

on top of the original drive-discharge threshold in order that the drive is not discharged explains how a tension-state should be so handled that it does not give rise to further tension, and so that the tension can be held. This is the basis of all structure-formation, and is indeed a reinstatement inside of something that is an external reality--a correspondent of the external reality-fact that the object isn't present. That can be handled the way I am handling it now from the point of view of structure-formation; that can be handled, as Roy pointed out Glover does, from the point of view of memory-trace organization, or it can be handled in the mythological way: that is, the bad object. Anywhere where such as early tension-maintaining device is encountered it may mythologize into fantasy-constructions of the patient, and then you get a mythology. So Klein isn't in thin air and Glover isn't in thin air, but they are making something that is a structural-historical-memorial reconstruction on the one hand, and a fantasy-reconstruction on the other.

This is the reason I raised the question of the relation between content and metapsychological concepts in Klein, Glover, and Fenichel.

What is the difference between saying that from the earliest time on there are bad objects, and the propositions that from the earliest time on counter-cathexes are established to heighten the drive-discharge threshold and postpone drive-discharge?

Gilmore: The difference between content and the metapsychological explanation.

Rapaport: Yes. In Klein, instead of metapsychological explanation, a fantasy is turned into a content. In Glover, who is inclined to the same thing, an insistence is made that specific memories have to be found, that out of a fantasy you can't reconstruct the existence of a bad object. Glover would insist that you have to find specific memories, and such memories cannot exist before a certain stage, before there are verbal traces.

We say the economic, structural, and dynamic conditions can be reconstructed, but that has nothing to do with fantasies. The fantasies of the patient are reflections of such and such conditions, not reflections of a mythological state--I am calling "mythological state" all this battle of the internalized objects. Are these differences clear? If they are, then you will have to see how Fenichel treats the same question. How does Fenichel treat the same thing in "The Economics of Pseudologia Phantastica," or "The Economic Function of Screen Memories"?

Plunkett: In the first place, I think that Fenichel was talking more of psychodynamics in discussing these points--

Rapaport: All content is what we call psychodynamics. That's right.

Plunkett: It wasn't clear to me whether he was referring to the economics of this as seen in the metapsychological sense. I missed the point.

Rapaport: Well, what is economics in Fenichel?

Gilmore: In Fenichel's paper, "The Economics of Pseudologia Phantastica," p. 133.

"Helene Deutsch has demonstrated that the content of the pseudologies are screen memories for true things. She believed that such demonstration justifies the theory that pseudology is distorted break-through of repressed memories. We agree with her findings completely, but we think that they must be complemented to the effect that it is not merely a break-through; the fact that the break-through occurs in this distorted form--that is, in the form of fantasies represented to others as real, though the subject knows that they are not--indicates that pseudology is an economic measure for the further maintenance of the repression."

Rapaport: Does anybody see clearly why he calls it an economic measure?

Gilmore: He makes reference to this on p. 137, I think.

"But the economic significance of this break-through lies in the special form of the distortion, which--as in perversions and screen memories--serves to maintain the repression and to deny the truth of the reality contained in the lie."

Rapaport: A very good quotation, but who will strip the psychodynamic stuff from it and state it simply in economic terms?

Suttenfield: The distortion maintains repression.

Rapaport: How does it maintain repression?

Suttenfield: In a way it's a displacement.

Rapaport: Yes, that's right. We have here a part of the quantity of energy which otherwise would require either giving up the repression or strengthening the repressive barrier, but which is so displaced or diverted--let's not be that specific on the displacement--as to ease the tension there. How do we know that? It was stated very clearly in the first quotation we got.

Suttenfield: Because...the memory doesn't break through.

Rapaport: But it does break through in the form of a distorted derivative. This is the usual conception of the maintenance of repression; derivatives of the repressed are produced to keep the tension down as much as possible. We have already discussed this in connection with what Glover meant by mobility. Obviously mobility is involved here, because only mobile cathexes will allow for such a thing. For this purpose, what is the key concept which is introduced by Fenichel, in the other paper? "The Economic Function of Screen Memories," p. 114:

"Hunger for screen experiences."

That is nothing else, obviously, than what Freud (in "The Unconscious") called the pull on the side of the unconscious, trying to create again newer and newer derivatives. From the side of the ego that is a hunger for screen experiences. From what does he infer that hunger? From the great intensity of the "inner injunction: 'Pay attention! You must remember this scene as long as you live!'"

We can then formulate what Fenichel does with this psychodynamic stuff; out of which Melanie Klein constructs a metapsychology of the introject, of the bad object, of the good object. What does Fenichel do?

Schafer: He says that these fantasy-formations serve an economic function, rather than representing basic mental structures or basic drives.

Rapaport: In other words, he doesn't create a mythology out of it; the economic consideration is well summarized in this catch-phrase, "Here something untrue is represented as true, to make it possible to represent something true as untrue." ("The Economics of Pseudologia Phantastica," p. 130).

One could go on from there to say that from the very beginning the psychic apparatus is so built by heredity that it makes something untrue into truth, in order to be able to represent something true as untrue. We know, however, that this is only a partial statement, which is much more correctly formulated by the specific statement of reaction-formation, a special mechanism, which indeed turns truth into untruth and untruth into truth.

Schafer: The whole psychology of displacement involves this.

Rapaport: That's right; but we talk about displacement and economics, instead of making such a mental mythology. I assigned the Fenichel papers to show you on that even where the discussion is in general purely on the level of psychodynamics, as defined by Gill, the explanation is metapsychological. True, only partial; it is only an economic explanation. Naturally, all the

other points of view could be applied too.

I assigned these papers for several reasons; partly so that you can contrast them with the procedure Melanie Klein uses, and partly as an example of how metapsychology is significant and important even in reading two purely clinical papers, and of how one reads such purely clinical papers and discovers whether the metapsychological concept was used correctly and usefully or not. As you notice, it is used both usefully and correctly.

We pointed out that Fenichel's formulation fits into the Freudian formulations concerning the pull from the unconscious and derivative-formations, and it was pointed out by Dr. Sutfeld that it is a displacement-like alleviation of the pressure against the repressive structures, so it is a useful understanding of what is happening. In addition, we have shown that it is clinically traceable in that there is a break-through. One would want to add to that one more clinical and theoretical consideration. When Fenichel, on p. 133, says that he has to add that this is not merely a break-through, but that it happens in a distorted form, he indicates that pseudology is an economic measure for the further maintenance of repression. That sentence also contains, to the best of my knowledge, a comment on generalization. Frequently you don't see the break-through any more, for even that can generalize. Pseudology becomes real pseudology when you can't any longer trace the break-through directly to the original.

It is hard to analyze pseudology. You have to find a very specific one, on which you can show a break-through, because just as repression will fortify itself by re-repressions, sooner or later this type of economic measure will become so far removed from the original thing that had to be defended against that the many lies will occur as a structuralized thing. You see, this comes in only if the structural conception is applied also. Many cases of pseudologia phantastica don't show their economics clearly, because the displacements are very far-reaching already, and it is structuralized that one has to lie.

White: Is this "getting structuralized" another way of saying that it takes on a relative autonomy from the original situation, and then what one lies about may not necessarily be connected with the original situation at all?

Rapaport: That's right. This is already a structural consideration, however, and you can see how one could go to adaptive considerations, how this all has a genetics, and all that. If you look over those illustrations again, you will see how fine the economics are. By the way, his economics are always excellent, much

better than his structural considerations; everybody was weak structurally. It is only Hartmann who dared to go out on a limb structurally, really, as well as Erikson who, however, disregarded the whole shebang and went and created something structural all on his own.

Schafer: Glover's discussion of repression, in his chapter on economics, seems to me to make a very similar point to Fenichel's here, where he talks about anticathexis as well as the withdrawal of cathexis, and talks about it in a way different from the one we discussed previously.

Rapaport: Do you want to read that into the record so that we can discuss its merit?

Schafer: This is on p. 71 of Psychoanalysis:
 "But withdrawal of cathexis is not the only activity involved in actual repression. In addition to withdrawing energy from the painful ideas, the unconscious ego 'goes out of its way' to counter-charge ideas other than those provoking pain (anticathexis)."

Then he gives an example. This seems like a related idea to Fenichel's, of the mobility of energy being used to maintain the state of repression. Something else is invested in order to help keep the true thing from coming into consciousness.

Rapaport: May I ask whether it would be correct to say that this is the only real economic discussion Glover gives in the whole chapter on economics?

Schafer: He talks about withdrawal of cathexis too.

Rapaport: But it's centered all around this one point, is that correct? Or am I giving a distorted picture of this?

Schafer: There are two stages in repression, he makes that very clear--the withdrawal of cathexis and the anticathexis. But he uses it in a different sense from the one we have used here before.

Rapaport: That I don't see quite clearly yet.

Schafer: Psychoanalysis, p. 71:
 "It countercharges ideas other than those provoking pain."
 It's a heightened cathexis of other ideas as a way of reinforcing repression.

Rapaport: Wouldn't you call that reaction-formation?

- Schafer: Well, at this point he's not committed to saying it is opposite ideas, though the example he gives is of a child looking in one direction because he's afraid of what's in the other direction.
- Rapaport: What I don't get, Roy, is why you say that he talks about it in another way. We have not talked about repression in this sense, but we have talked about the luxuriation of the repressed and its steady cathecting of other ideas, to which countercahexis then has to be added.
- Schafer: But he doesn't say that.
- Rapaport: It is really a partial discussion. In our old discussion, two years ago, we went through that. Do you really see something radically new here?
- Schafer: No. If he filled that in it wouldn't be. My main point was to call attention to the fact that his line of reasoning is very similar to Fenichel's.
- Rapaport: Since the emphasis is on those ideas to which the repressed impulse is then displaced and in the after-expulsion had to be countercahected again.
- I have to make one more point, and then let's go to the economic point that Roy brought up. I would like the statement on p. 18 of Basic Mental Concepts to be in the record, because he again shows how he really has an idea of the structural point of view, in spite of treating structure mainly in terms of verbal presentations.
- White: Basic Mental Concepts, p. 18:
 "The object imago thus acquires and retains the status of an ego-system. And as a psycho-biological series of objects of infantile component instincts progresses and each object is in turn abandoned or the appropriate impulses repressed, the structure of the ego grows by acts of introjection. In short, the original dynamic and compensatory functions of introjection are exploited by a weak ego-system in order to strengthen itself."
- Rapaport: These statements obviously are the reflections of what Freudian statements?
- Plunkett: The Ego and the Id: The ego is the precipitate of abandoned object-cathexis.
- Rapaport: That's right.

Schafer: I noted this sentence in another context. It seems to me this is a place where the genetic point of view is also represented in Glover's thinking.

Rapaport: That's rather ubiquitous, isn't it? He makes genetic statements everywhere.

Schafer: He makes a lot of genetic psychodynamic statements, but from time to time he makes statements about phase-specificity and how this is from the standpoint of the drives and how it is from the standpoint of the ego, which are more abstract formulations, and I thought this was one that was relevant.

Rapaport: I would agree. It is unlikely that we will be able to discuss genetics and I wanted this to be in the record, since we showed how in the introjection-identification conceptions he is really teetering back and forth on this structural stuff.

We have already started saying--concerning the economic point of view, which we have on record as Gill and Rapaport formulated it--that Glover has in the discussion of repression a set of statements concerning those quantities which, according to Freud (and in our reformulation) are the center of economics. What does he consider to be economics?

Schafer: The mental mechanisms and the way they deal with energy.

Rapaport: The mental mechanisms. He describes all the mental mechanisms; that is economics for him. What's right and what's wrong about that?

White: They are the processes whereby quantities of energy are interchanged or handled.

Rapaport: They are the means; let's put it that way.

Schafer: He also implies a concept of countercausality--

Rapaport: Not for all of the mechanisms, necessarily. Not, for instance, for displacement or for condensation. Only those mechanisms which we are inclined to consider defense-mechanisms or controlling mechanisms imply this. So in the sense that these are means, tools of transformation, disposition, discharge, etc., of energies, they are relevant to economics. They have an economic function. Per se, what are they?

Here we are faced with a peculiar conundrum which we have tried to disentangle once, and we have to be aware of. Take, for instance, displacement. Clearly, displacement on the highest level is what in logic is called generalization. Generalization,

as trained minds do it, is a pure mechanism. Displacement as the case of pseudoclogia phantastica would do it, is also a mechanism. It's a well grooved-in, stable characteristic of the mind. But, is it a mechanism in that sense when it is employed in a dream?

White: Is it a defense-mechanism?

Rapaport: Is it something as stable, as steady a fixture of the mind as a defense-mechanism like, say, reaction-formation? Or is it rather a process?

White: I don't see how this process can occur in a dream without a basic assumption of a structure which performs this process, since--

Rapaport: Well; any comments on this?

Schafer: I think Freud treated this in an uncoordinated way, because he talks about displacement as a characteristic of the primary process, and I think we discussed this in the old seminar. We also discussed it as a mechanism of the dream-work.

Rapaport: And we know that it can be a mechanism of adaptation, as for instance in generalization.

Schafer: Finding substitute-gratifications.

Rapaport: That's right. So what is it? Let's take another example, maybe it will enlighten you. Let's suppose we take the example of the turning back of the impulse upon the subject. What is that? Is it a mechanism or not?

White: It's a defense-mechanism--

Plunkett: Structuralized--

Rapaport: Later on, certainly. But to begin with--

Schafer: It's an instance of mobility; it's a primary process kind of concept.

Rapaport: You see, we cannot be sure. One thing is certain: that we have to distinguish between the first time a generalization is made, when it is very primitive, and when a generalization is already a grooved-in, well-known thing. I am talking about generalization and displacement as a process or as a mechanism. There is only way to get away from presupposing that to begin with it is a process and later it crystallizes into a mechanism of defense, and later into a mechanism of adaptation. The only way to get away from that is to say that that structure

which we call id has primitive structures at its disposal, and these are the mechanisms of the primary process.

White: Why can't it be conceptualized equally well that these are the effects of some of the primitive ego-structures, some of the givens, on the transformation and permutations of instincts?

Rapaport: It could be equally well conceptualized that way. There would be one thing you would be up against if you did it that way; you would divest the id of the last possibility of its being a structure. Then you would have a structural conception of ego, id, and superego, in which one of them isn't a structure. The way you can get away from it is by saying that to begin with, ego and id are undifferentiated.

White: This business of the structural aspect of the id gets all confused, because the id is so often equated in our thinking with primitive energy.

Rapaport: It is the storehouse of that energy, but it also has direction, and that gives it one structural feature. Whatever the concepts which are subsumed under the concept id refer to, they are endowed by us with direction. Moreover, we also endow them with this character of mobility which, according to Glover's economics, is closely linked to, or linked to nothing else but, these mechanisms. According to Freud, these were mechanisms of the unconscious, mechanisms of the dream, mechanisms by which drives operate. This is a conceptual question. I would not favor saying that everything that is structuralized should be attributed to the ego. Rather, I would be inclined to say that these concepts are abstractions; that to begin with there is an undifferentiated phase, and that from that, with differentiation, controlling organizations and defensive organizations are derived. It would be preferable for us to attribute to the id some of the most primitive mechanisms of organization--these would be mechanisms which later the ego uses equally--but I would be inclined not to rob the id of them. However, there is no precedent in the literature for clarifying this thing.

Glover's putting these under economics puts the question to us squarely. Where do these really belong? On the higher level they certainly are structures. On the lower level they may be simply processes, ad hoc forms; this is how instinctual energies move, even when there is no specific controlling structure.

White: Can one think of energy-transformation-processes without there being some structure which mediates?

Rapaport: I would like to suggest that one cannot, but even before the

ego is specifically formed, there is reason to assume that these processes of displacement and generalization take place. This we know out of Piaget's observations. We know that the original sucking reflex is ready very early to accept any object, and modifies itself to those objects. That is a displacement, and a generalization. If this is an instinctual action, then this is a generalization. True, there the instinct also uses other structures, such as somatic structures, the oral orifice, and all the appurtenances of it.

White: And the given ego-apparatus of sucking?

Rapaport: Yes, but there is no ego-id differentiation in our system yet. But do you see the point? You don't have to make a decision. The point has to be seen clearly that when Glover subsumes all the mechanisms under the economic point of view, the question is raised, what are these mechanisms? To be sure, as has already been mentioned, on a high level these are certainly structures.

Schafer: In your paper with Gill, I thought the answer you proposed to this question was that mental mechanisms have to be defined from all five points of view.

Rapaport: Yes, insofar as we have already said what is right and what is wrong about brother Glover. What is right about it certainly is that there is an economic implication. We have also pointed out that the drive itself may have this in its nature. For instance, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" speaks about that. Fundamentally, however, when you talk about a mechanism that is steadily present, you are talking about something abiding. The instinct itself fluctuates in its intensity, in its point of appearance, and only as a concept is it steadily there. There is always a force behind behavior, and in that respect it is a structure. The mechanisms are there to be used on various levels. They are abiding features of the organization, therefore centrally the first question to raise about them is a structural question. Obviously we talked about their genetics when we talked about the whole series of forms they take, from the instinctual vicissitudes to defenses to adaptive mechanisms.

For the record, let's put down what Glover has to say on economics on p. 67 of Psychoanalysis.

Schafer: "The investigation of ways and means of solving the problems of adaptation constitutes the economic approach to mental activity. It is indeed the only approach which gives us a clear idea of the total function of mind; namely to reduce the sum of mental excitation to an optimum

level, either by securing gratification of instinct or by maintaining an effective balance between the claims of conflicting instincts."

I think the last sentence of the following paragraph is also relevant:

"This economy of mental function is achieved by means of a number of unconscious mental mechanisms."

Rapaport: This is more or less his definition of economics. The first sentence that you read into the record brings in the whole adaptive problem, however; and the sentence which you quoted from the end of the second paragraph makes it clear how he makes the mechanisms the central topic of discussion throughout this chapter on "The Economics of the Mind."

Let us now go on to the genetic point of view. First, what are the main propositions; second, where would you look for them?

Gilmore: The definition Gill-Rapaport give is on p. 33:
"By the genetic point of view of psychoanalytic metapsychology we mean a consideration of behavior in regard to its psychological historical development."

Rapaport: That is the definition. Satisfied with the definition? Let's have it.

Schafer: Some of the propositions which come under this heading I'm not sure can be strictly considered psychological. I mean, they're psychobiological considerations.

Rapaport: As it is defined?

Schafer: No. I was just raising a question about how you say "its psychological historical development," whereas in connection with some of the propositions concerned with it you mentioned somatic and maturational factors--for instance on p. 42:
"The epigenesis of behavior has several aspects: somatic maturation, psychosexual, ego, and psychosocial epigenesis."

Rapaport: Well, how do we square that off? Do you want to take out of the definition the "psychological" or do you want to square that off with what is there? It is a very interesting problem and there are several ways of dealing with it. How would you like to do this?

Schafer: I think psychobiological is a term that would be more comprehensive.

- Rapaport: That's one way to do it, namely, to acknowledge what one knows anyway. Even if you talk about Freud's definition of instinct, it becomes something that you might as well call psychobiological if you want to. That's one way to deal with it. Is there any good reason that you could bring up in defense of this kind of definition?
- White: One might say that there are biological factors which have to be considered along with this, and attempt to limit one's consideration to the purely psychological.
- Rapaport: Well, what would be your reason to do so?
- White: It is simpler that way, for one reason, even though it would be an incomplete consideration of the historical development.
- Miller: All the somatic or biological things that would be relevant to this metapsychological point of view have psychological representations, which we might limit our considerations to.
- Schafer: But you don't limit it to that. For instance, we talk about the inborn thresholds as being the sort of primordial form of later counter-cathetic development; it's built right into the thinking.
- Rapaport: I believe that both arguments are good. This is a matter of decision, to my mind. Somebody else could argue that it is not a matter of decision, that this should be an empirical matter. But where you form definitions you are a sovereign in your own right. The question is only whether those definitions will ultimately, when it comes down to empirical matters, be useful or useless. I can't argue that point further. The point I could argue further is something on the line Dr. White and Dr. Miller argued, which is not an argument in any sense better than the empirical argument--yours is the empirical argument, Roy. I would like to bring their point into a form in which I would express it. Namely, that the question here is where do you take your stand? What is the focus of psychoanalytic metapsychology? If its focus is a psychological focus, then we are entitled to speak in all the other definitions about psychology. For instance, I am reasonably sure that there is an expression "psychological energies." If we take a psychobiological point of view, we would have to speak about biological energies too, because they are in question somewhere. From the purely clinical standpoint we know that if a person is physically exhausted, certain things happen to the economy of psychological energy. By sheer physical exhaustion we can achieve certain kinds of changes. An example of this is the Minnesota studies on conscientious objectors in the course of war. We know that serious dislocations can be achieved, but this does not gainsay Roy's

point--that fundamentally, from the empirical point of view, we always are hitting on psychosomatic, psychobiological issues throughout this. It's a question of where you take your stand to make order. Definitions are to make certain kinds of order, to orient oneself. The goal here was to orient yourself around the psychological, and with the utmost caution bring in the biological matters on the periphery. Now this is a very important point because both in Jacobson and in the paper by Max Schur we will run into this problem. The framework within which these definitions were drawn up tried to emphasize the focus as psychological, and let the psychosomatic and the psychobiological (where so much of our ignorance lies) come in on the periphery.

Schafer: Would you use the same consideration as regards the reality point of view on sociology? In your definition of the adaptive point of view, you say it is the consideration of behavior in its psychological relation to reality. But when you talk about reality, it also becomes a sociological reality, just the way development is a biological reality.

Rapaport: I would adopt the same point of view, though I would say that at present our knowledge of the interrelationships there is far superior to our metapsychological knowledge concerning interrelationships in the psychosomatic field. This is so because the psychosomatic field, which has been attacked empirically to a large extent, has been far less attacked theoretically.

Schafer: But the definition you restricted to the psychological--

Rapaport: How well we succeeded or how well we will succeed, I do not know. Let me put this point in a fighting form. I believe that it is true that Gill and I were sick and tired of people talking about somatic matters about which they had hardly any understanding. (By the way, we would apply the same kind of caution for sociological matters for which there is no understanding whatsoever.) If there is an empirical piece of knowledge about the psychosomatic relationship, okay. Our theoretical knowledge of even the most elementary psychosomatic relationship, the conversion symptom--which is the basic one, the oldest, the best known--is so primitive that this whole psychoanalytic hullabaloo about psychosomatics serves largely one purpose, namely to blind our eyes to what the system of our theory is. In that literature emotions are used as equivalents of drives, drives are used as equivalents of anything which is somatic energy. It is a hodgepodge, a total conceptual chaos. This kind of thing forces the theoretician to take his stand where he can make a clean slate. This is the essential point. The theoretical problem is to take your stand at a point from which you can hope to unravel the ball of yarn. It is not

where empirical real discoveries come--the empirical real discoveries come if you go in where the angels fear to tread. Theoretically you always want to take your stand where the situation is clear, where you can pull something and things fall into their place.

The definition as given, however, does not state what the center of the genetic point of view really is. What is the central contention in the genetic point of view?

- Plunkett: The epigenetic idea, or the idea of the groundplan.
- Rapaport: Yes. How would you put it directly?
- White: Orderly, predetermined sequences.
- Rapaport: Orderly, predetermined sequence of emergence of forms of behavior. From where could you put it into the record most simply?
- Schafer: It's in Erikson.
- Rapaport: The proximal thing is to take it directly from Erikson. Another point from which you could put it in easily--?
- White: "Three Contributions."
- Rapaport: "Three Contributions." It is a subordinate question from the standpoint of the genetic point of view whether that is stated in libido-theoretical terms or ego-theoretical terms.
- Schafer: The Problem of Anxiety, with regard to anxiety.
- Rapaport: The Problem of Anxiety has an excellent statement of it. There's another on p. 42 of the Gill-Rapaport manuscript.
- Schafer: Isn't the A proposition, the development of primitive to more mature forms, somewhat separate and equally fundamental?
- Rapaport: Yes, I would say that it is fundamental. However, would you not say that the predetermined sequence includes or subsumes that, because that is a specification of the character of the sequential steps in this predetermined sequence?
- Schafer: There are two characters; one is phase-specificity and one is increasing complexity or maturity.
- Rapaport: To my mind the phase-sequence would be a spelling out of the increasing complexity. There I would establish a hierarchic order; but as you notice, as soon as you go from the very

general proposition that all of it is psychological history, to the predetermined sequence, you are no longer purely in the genetic realm. What comes in when you begin to talk about predetermined sequence?

Plunkett: Structure.

Rapaport: To explain it, you would have to resort to structures.

Schafer: Erikson treats it under the adaptive point of view.

Rapaport: The modifiability, and the variability---that while it is predetermined, it can take many kinds of forms. That would be an adaptive problem.

Schafer: Erikson puts it into such things as states of adaptedness. In talking about Hartmann's work he says there is actually a whole series of states of adaptedness, which is not exactly the same.

"The Problem of Ego Identity," p. 107:

"The specific kind of preadaptedness of the human infant, namely the readiness to grow by predetermined steps through psychosocial crises, encompasses not only one average expectable environment but a whole chain of such successive environments. As the child adapts in spurts and stages, he gets ready at any given stage reached for the next average expectable environment."

Rapaport: So it is preparedness for a series of average expectable environments. Meaning that this sequence itself is already tied in with the adaptive point of view. As soon as you make that step, you already have at least some adaptive things and some structural things. When you move on from there to discuss differentiation, you have the whole structural business, because when you are speaking of differentiation, it's a question of what has differentiated, and what are the foundations of these differentiated phenomena. If you go to phase-sequence, you have to consider the different forces that come into play, which then involves dynamic considerations. Economics comes along also, but one could underplay it for a long while, just as Erikson underplayed it. One of the characteristic things about the genetic point of view is that it can be treated in many ways without recourse to economics. From the phenomenology of it, the considerations go first of all to the adaptive problem. The question "why" is a crucial thing for the genetic point of view, because it indicates how it differs from everything else. What is the specifically differentiating earmark of the genetic thinking from any other kind of thinking? What is the opposite of genetic thinking?

- Schafer: The tabula rasa conception is the opposite.
- Rapaport: That's it. It subsumes all that we talked about. Namely, the opposite of the genetic consideration is that all changes in behavior come about because of environmental influences.
- Plunkett: I think Erikson's statement, "for the infant does not and cannot build anew and out of himself the course of human life," concerns the point that is being made, namely that it isn't a tabula rasa, that the infant doesn't start with nothing at all and build from there.
- Rapaport: The Erikson statement doesn't have that purpose. The Erikson statement there has the purpose of saying that it needs to have some kind of aliment, some kind of nutrition, some kind of support, from the environment. It is actually the limitation of the genetic point of view that Erikson aims at. Erikson points to the regulation of the genetic point of view by the adaptive point of view and of the genetic process by adaptation-processes. You see again that the point of view itself does not have direct empirical equivalents and that it is a point of view which will help to dissect and to discern one major aspect of the behavior. As soon as you bring in the more specific derivations made out of the point of view, then you implicate all the other points of view.

Let us now take a look at what Glover has to say on the genetic point of view, so that we see what kind of major concepts can be subsumed under it.

- Schafer: Psychoanalysis, p. 66:
 "Without in any way departing from the principle of psychic continuity, it maintains that the natural order of psychic development is from the simple to the complex."
- Rapaport: This is his third-order formulation, which in our sequence was the first-order formulation. You will note that on p. 3 of Basic Mental Concepts there is a discussion where he points out in a footnote that the other, competing, psychoanalytic theories have disregarded the developmental point of view. It's a very important reference because it shows that the disregard of a metapsychological point of view can lead to theories which are as ex parte as Jung's or Horney's, and that the use of metapsychological theory is to keep clearly before us what the essential ingredients are concerning any behavior lest an ex parte theory of behavior be developed. I would consider that, after the defining sentence Roy has quoted, as one of the essential contributions we can derive from Glover concerning the uses of the genetic theory.

Then I would certainly say that the ego-nuclei organized around partial drives are one of the outstanding genetic propositions here. What reservation would we make about this genetic proposition?

Schafer: It's not simply genetic.

Rapaport: There is what kind of implication involved?

Schafer: Structural.

Rapaport: Well, first of all there is a dynamic implication in it, that these are forces around which the ego-nuclei crystallize. Then there is structural, but the trouble is that the structural and the dynamic are not separated, and the question remains whether this indeed follows the structural development to the end.

White: But I don't see how you can get away with the dynamic point of criticism, because structures are after all stable energy-distributions, if I understand their conceptions correctly.

Rapaport: But this is what he disregards indeed. If he would investigate how these developed, what the energetics and economics are, he would have to discover sooner or later that they do not have energetic explanations but that they are advance-given structures. There you get again to Roy's original point, that genetic considerations lead you back to certain givens, which are somatic, constitutional givens. He makes one important genetic proposition concerning the ego which I would like to have on record. I have in mind the verbal trace businesses, where he attributes first of all to memories, second to verbal memories, the basic role in ego-formation. We discussed this earlier, but I want to bring it in again as an application of the genetic point of view to the ego. Where is the reference to that?

Schafer: Psychoanalysis, p. 55:
"Theoretically regarded the ego is simply the total organization of memory traces."

Rapaport: Memory-traces. This is one of the crucial passages. Another one is on p. 9, Basic Mental Concepts:

"In other words the development of speech provides us with a reliable time-measure of early developmental phases."

This is worth while only after the quotation Roy gave us. Then if you go to page 14, Basic Mental Concepts, you find:

"We may hazard the guess that organization of the ego cannot take place so long as the mind is mainly governed by primary processes, that is to say, before the organization of speech and the elaboration of the pre-conscious system."

You see that these are genetic propositions concerning the ego, and as their center they all have memory, verbal traces, and speech.

If you were arbitrarily to group psychoanalytic concepts as belonging more to one point of view than to another, which concepts would you subsume under the genetic point of view?

Schafer: You mentioned fixation and regression in your discussion.

Rapaport: I would think that of any, fixation and regression would have to be considered among the first. Isn't there something that would have to be considered even ahead of them?

White: What you get fixated at or regressed from, in terms of psychosexual and social-developmental phase.

Rapaport: Very well, any time you talk about stages or phase-specificities, yes. That belongs there, though these are not specific concepts; these are rather conceptions, which are very important because they are the genetic conception.

White: A psychosexual stage is not a concept?

Rapaport: A stage or a phase is not a concept specific to psychoanalysis. If you add the psychosexual, then it is specific; but in doing that you already have added dynamic and economic considerations. I am just trying to indicate that the stage and phase are indispensable conceptions here, but they are not specific concepts. As soon as you add the ego-developmental phase, this kind of phase, that kind of phase, you have specific concepts.

There is something else that is rather specific here. It comes out of the third type of genetic proposition Glover mentioned.

Miller: I had an idea but I'm not sure it comes out of the third type. Identification belongs.

Rapaport: I would be rather doubtful. Why would you think that it does?

Miller: In line with what we were going over a minute ago about genetic propositions concerning ego-development--all that is implied by the definition of ego as a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes.

Rapaport: If somebody links ego-development to speech, then he is nearly on a purely maturational basis because there it is not decisive whether or not speech will be forthcoming if no verbal sounds are heard. As soon as one takes memory per se as the basis, one already talks about an environmental interrelationship.

When one takes identification, one takes specific social-environmental relationships. Now if you compare that with regression or fixation as concepts, you can see how much less right you have to group it essentially with the genetic things. The third type of proposition, which states that progressive differentiation is characteristic for this process, holds true for the sequential phases, the differentiation of partial drives, and differentiation and synthesis, and in those Hartmann terms where it becomes a special concept.

I'm not trying to say that identification does not have genetic aspects, or that identification isn't a crucial thing to the genetic aspects of ego-development. I'm just trying to show that it has a genetic role of a subordinate character, in comparison to these others.

Schafer: Wouldn't maturation come under that?

Rapaport: This is the same unanswerable question you raised in the beginning; namely, the evolutionary-somatic-constitutional question. It is obvious, isn't it, that when we talk about development, we talk about something that is prescribed? Erikson puts it this way: the same laws which brought forth organs in a determinate sequence in the embryological development bring about behavior-forms in the postnatal development.*

White: These various metapsychological points of view get so intertwined, and each one has certain aspects of the others whenever we try to consider anything specific, so that it seems to me that if one thought about structure as being that which develops over time, and the economic and dynamic points of view as functions of structure, then you would have to put structure above the others as changing over time. In turn, these changes in structure over time would determine energy-interchanges and directions, and, if you include energy-interchanges not only as intrapsychic but interego, then you could work the adaptive point of view in also.

Rapaport: Meaning you would want to make the structural point of view the most general, and subordinate all the rest to it?

White: It and its changes over time, if you include the changes over time under structure.

Rapaport: In the beginning of the Gill-Rapaport manuscript there is a draft by Gill in which he argues for a hierarchic differentiation between the points of view, and says not to place them on the same level and order. Dr. Plunkett, do you want to summarize that?

*Erikson, Erik, "Problems of Infancy and Early Childhood," *Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery and Specialties*, 1940, pp. 714-730.

- Plunkett: As I recall, his argument concerned whether you could include the adaptive and genetic points of view as being on the same level of abstraction as the structural, dynamic, and economic points of view. I didn't feel that he was making Bob's point at all. I mean, Bob wants to subsume everything under structure.
- Rapaport: Yes, there you are right, Gill's argument was not this radical. Can you get the reference?
- Plunkett: Gill, "The Metapsychology of Regression," p. 4:
 "It is also true that logically adaptive is not on the same level of abstraction as dynamic, economic, and structural."
 He then proposes a scheme of the dichotomy between intrapsychic and adaptive.
- Gilmore: I thought we were talking about different levels of abstraction here, rather than--for instance, Gill's saying
 "Are the genetic propositions psychoanalytic or metapsychological propositions? We suggest resolving this by discussing genetic propositions as existing on various levels of abstraction." (Gill-Rapaport, p. 16)
- Rapaport: Yes, that and Dr. Plunkett's point are both pertinent. I have a memo from Pious, who suggests something more like what Dr. White suggested.
- Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to say that here the same kind of rule applied again for Gill and me. We tried not to seek out those hierarchic differences, or those levels of abstraction that the empirical observations make probable, but rather to assign these points of view arbitrarily to the same level of abstraction. True, if you start out from the phenomena themselves, you could very well argue as Dr. White argues--that all of the metapsychological points of view are so intertwined with each other, let us find one which is present everywhere; structure really marks at every step what advance has been made, so why don't we take that as the basic thing, relegate all the others to a lower level of generality because they have a lower level of indicativeness, etc.
- Now, you see that way you get into an empirical argument. Let me point out what that argument is. If you say it is the structure which functions, and corresponding economic, dynamic, and adaptive transactions take place according to the level of development, then you forget only one thing: that structure does not only function, but its functions build new structure, and that wreaks havoc with your assumption. If we investigate

function on any given level of the psychic apparatus, what will be the common bipolar characteristics of such function on any and all levels of the psychic apparatus or psychic development? Peremptoriness and delay. These are basic characteristics. They repeat themselves in various degrees and admixtures on every level. This is a paramount pervading characteristic of function, which you can't relegate to structures. What you really are asking is, couldn't structure be made the a priori, the starting point for everything, out of which everything would be deduced? As it turns out, the major a priori from which everything in psychoanalysis starts out is this distinction between the two characteristics of function.

White: But if you started with the assumption of an inborn amount of available undifferentiated energy that will be delayed or discharged, and discharged in various forms, and directions, as it passes through increasingly complex structure...

Rapaport: Then?

Miller: Then the structure determines the peremptoriness or the delay.

Rapaport: No. It determines only to what degree on this level of structure-formation delay is going to be enforced or peremptoriness have sway. To what degree reality principle or pleasure principle--because these are the concepts under which we subsume these observations concerning function--is going to hold sway on this level. Wherever you see function, these characteristics of function are present.

You must understand that when you build a theoretical structure, you make an assumption about a prioris. The metapsychological five points of view deny the possibility of a distinguished a priori. The reason we do not make hierarchic distinctions between these five points of view is that as far as we know today, from the point of view of theoretically building up a system that should correspond to behavior and its development, we can't take any of them to be prior.

I appreciate the question, because I think it leads into the very core of the issue. From another point of view, it represents what we discussed earlier concerning how the metapsychological points of view are to be empty and therefore independent from each other in their abstract formulation to as great a degree as possible. When you now ask, "Why don't we subordinate one of them to the others?" the answer is that we do not see how the economic could be subordinated to the genetic, or the genetic be subordinated to the dynamic, or the dynamic be subordinated to any other.

Obviously, you could attack this and raise questions about the relationship of the economic and the dynamic, the distinctions between which are some of the most tenuous ones. Sooner or later it might be possible to get rid of these, except at times we have to speak about forces, and we have no way of measuring them. The degree of peremptoriness of discharge, while it cannot be measured, can at least be put into an intensive series: this greater than that, and that greater than that. A good example for that is the commonly used one that the cathexes of the drive are quantitatively greater than those of the affect, and those of the affect quantitatively greater than those of the ideational representations. Such intensive quantitative series --meaning greater than, lesser than--can be established. Roy, you are shaking your head?

Schafer: I have several thoughts, because in my own thinking I have played with the idea that the dynamic point of view might be the superordinate one because structures are dynamic, with slower rates of change, so you could come at it that way. As I thought about it, it seemed to me that Freud's original statement about the uses of metapsychology cut through this. He says you can't explain psychological events without all these different points of view, and the question as to which might be given the most weight would seem to me to vary with the particular thing you're trying to account for. But if you said structure was superordinate, in talking about any particular event you would still have to think of how did this evolve, what are the forces, what is the relation to reality, and so forth. So you can't get away from it, and I think there are two separate questions there.

Rapaport: Which are these questions?

Schafer: One question would be: can you set up a hierarchical order of the metapsychological points of view? The other thing is: can you dispense with any of them, whatever the hierarchy? There I think one cannot dispense with them because sooner or later you get into them in talking about any particular event.

Rapaport: I agree that there are two problems, namely whether one can dispense with any, and what hierarchic organization can one give them. My answer to both of them would be no, simply because it does not seem that any of these is a prior given. The genetic sequence, the groundplan, is given at the same time as the forces are given; the forces are not conceivable without energy, economics, and the rule of peremptoriness; without adaptation, no genetics.

Yesterday we heard a long seminar about this, on how even structures like the eye can't be conceived of as prior givens

utterly independent in their development from the environmental givens. If you deprive the eye of light you have a decay either of the actual organs themselves or at least of the function of the organs without any microscopic evidence of decay.

This is essentially a question of the a prioris. Every system has to find some a prioris. For another instance, in Euclidian geometry you have to have a number of postulates. There was always the quest for one postulate, but with no success. Hilbert succeeded in reducing the five to three, but those three are indispensable if the whole geometry is to be built up. And you can't say that one is superordinate to the others, because as soon as you establish a real superordination then you dispense with one of them, because the superordination would have to imply coordination-rules. The coordination-rules would derive one at least partly from the others, so either you dispense with the others or you reduce the others to a form where they are independent and therefore no coordination would be possible.

Just for the record, I would still like to add here from Parche and Renard, p. 283:

"We must therefore retain the hypothesis of perceptive hereditary patterns if we wish to conserve to the economic point of view its full meaning and fruitfulness."

In other words, we find here a proposition which would be very interesting to discuss in its context, showing that in order to have an economic point of view you also already have to have a genetic and a structural point of view.

Schafer: And an adaptive one, too.

Rapaport: I don't see that.

Schafer: Because he's trying to establish the basis on which object-relations can---

Rapaport: Yes, that's the context of it. I thought it would be interesting just to note that again--and it's quite apropos to the point Dr. White made.

All right, let's read into the record the definition of the adaptive point of view.

Plunkett: The definition is on p. 33 of the Gill-Rapaport paper:

"By the adaptive point of view of psycho-analytic metapsychology we mean a consideration of behavior in regard to its psychological relationship to reality."

- Rapaport: What is the most general major proposition besides the formal definition that the adaptive point of view would imply?
- Miller: Behavior and reality have influences on each other.
- Rapaport: No behavior takes place in a vacuum, dependent only on the internal conditions of the behaving organism. Is that what you mean, or do you mean something--
- Miller: That's half of what I mean.
- Rapaport: What is the other half?
- Miller: That a consideration of behavior in relation to external reality should include not only that but the other half, which is that the behavior may bring about changes in reality.
- Rapaport: Yes, a very important point. To state it more completely, behavior doesn't take place in a vacuum; it is neither solely dependent on the internal conditions of the behaving organism, nor does it occur in an unchanging environment; it changes the environment, and its goal is often alloplastic. If you read this you will see that yours was too specific, because it already implies the alloplastic propositions, which would be highly specifying. Several steps would have to be in between there before you reach that point, just as we would have several steps before the reality principle in the broader, Hartmannian sense of the fitting-in, would be reached.
- Some proposition like this would be the most general proposition, but put this way there is a very great hole in it. To restate the first part of the proposition: no behavior takes place in a vacuum dependent only on the internal conditions of the organism. Where is the hole in it?
- Suttenfield: Aren't you leaving out the interaction between the autoplatic processes and the alloplastic processes?
- Rapaport: No, I am not leaving them out, because I actually make space for them. This definition establishes conceptual space for the interactions. It says the behavior is not in a vacuum and that it doesn't depend only on the internal conditions; this provides conceptual space to conceptualize all the interactions, because it doesn't fill in the specificity that there are interactions and what kind of interactions they are. In a theory which has only intrapsychic forces, all behavior is determined by intrapsychic happenings. Drive-theory or libido-theory could be so construed, and there, there is no conceptual space left for the interactions. We have made space for it by this definition. Where is the hole?

- Schafer: What occurs to me is the issue of relative autonomy.
- Rapaport: Obviously. Particularly the issue of primary autonomy, because many behaviors, physiological ones for instance, take place without external interferences or interventions or supports.
- White: Even there you could make space for Stuart's point, provided you go back prenatally a spell.
- Rapaport: All right, that's the hole in it; that you would have to specify here that no behavior takes place in a vacuum, it is always related to an environment, either in utero or in advanced given coordinations to that environment.
- White: By that you mean the preparation for the average expectable environment.
- Rapaport: That's right; something like this would have to be added.
Let's try to see what the other major adaptive propositions are that we have to consider.
- White: One is that the development and maintenance of intrapsychic functions and structures is dependent on external influences.
- Rapaport: There is a hole in that, too, because we would have to establish that there are structures, like perceptual structures, which, in advance, coordinate man with his environment.
- Miller: From that seminar last night a point is apropos here--that there are givens, for instance perceptual apparatuses, that provide one side of a possible coordination with the environment, with an average expectable environment. But if in some unexpected environment the other side isn't provided, then these things don't autonomously develop.
- Rapaport: Well, that's a well-taken point, but note, Dr. White's point placed the emphasis on the development and maintenance; I add, the existence, development, and maintenance. The existence starts with the originally given state of adaptedness. My assertion is that no structures can develop without inborn coordinating structures, structures coordinating man and environment, nor can such structures be developed and maintained without further coordinations between environment and organism. Are there any references anywhere in what you read that makes those points clear?
- Schafer: In Psychoanalysis, p. 23, Glover speaks of constitutional factors such as the capacity to tolerate frustration:
"Capacity to endure delay in gratification or

to secure substitute gratification is one of the characteristics distinguishing man from the other mammals."

This seems to me in a way a specification of the state of adaptedness.

Rapaport: Yes. There is a much more telling one on p. 56:
"Excessive reduction in object contacts owing to extrinsic causes is also a precipitating factor in breakdown. This is observed in an acute form in the reactions to solitary confinement in prison, or in a less striking degree in the prolonged segregation from objects of the opposite sex, a state of affairs that arises more frequently under conditions of combatant service."

White: Or in Lilly's tank.

Rapaport: "These interruptions are however less significant than the withdrawal of object libido within the mind."

We have strong doubts about that, but as you see, the Lilly tank and all these things come quite a bit after Glover wrote this. You will find a summary of these issues in the new ego autonomy paper which I wrote.

Forgetting Erikson and Hartmann for the moment, what are the major adaptive propositions in classical psychoanalysis?

Schafer: The anaclitic nature of the early object-relations.

Rapaport: The object-relations indeed are the major proposition. Classical psychoanalytic theory, from the beginning on, coordinated objects to instincts. Remember our metapsychological discussions on the nature of instinct, on the kind of definition it is, what kind of force it is, and how it puts the cart before the horse in order to show the problem of behavior being purposive yet at the same time driven a tergo by a force that science can accept as a force. And remember that the type of force postulated is defined so that it works only on a trigger, which is an object. Object-relations; that is the first one, the basic one, in all classic psychoanalysis. In this sense, one could then take Dr. White's point that no structures develop without that. If you call the environmental influence aliment, the food for structure-development, then what is the first food for structure-development, what environmental input? Objects.

I am trying to do two things. First, to take aliment and the object, and object-loss and need for object, stimulus-hunger, and link it to your proposition that structure development and

maintenance of structure need environmental input. Second, to point out that we have there a different view of why object-relations actually became the fundamental core of all psychoanalytic theory, and how through them psychoanalytic theory had from the very beginning an adaptive point of view built into it, even if Freud did not include that in metapsychology at that time. Glover and Parche both drove home, through numerous propositions, that objects are things that exist in the outside and are not just extrapsychic phenomena. In all those propositions you find adaptive implications, and psychoanalytic theory never got along without it, whether or not it knew that it was talking adaptation all the time.