

SEMINARS ON ADVANCED METAPSYCHOLOGY

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Edited by Stuart C. Miller, M.D., et al.

Volume IV: Reality

#### IV. Reality

##### (A) Bibliography:

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- (4) Hartmann, H. "Contribution to the Metapsychology of Schizophrenia," Psa. Study Child, 8:177-198;1953.
- (5) Hartmann, H. "Notes on the Theory of Sublimation," Psa. Study Child, 10:9-29;1955.
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- (7) Hartmann, H., Kris, E., & Loewenstein, R. "Some Psychoanalytic Comments on 'Culture and Personality.'" In: Psychoanalysis and Culture, ed. G. Wilbur & W. Muensterberger, New York, International Universities Press, 1951, pp. 3-31.
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- (10) Loewald, H. "The Problem of Defence and the Neurotic Interpretation of Reality," Int. J. Psa., 33:444-449;1952.
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- (12) Schur, M. "Comments on the Metapsychology of Somatization," Psa. Study Child, 10:119-164;1955.

##### (B) Problems:

- (1) Why is sublimation pertinent to the problem of reality? What are the two characteristics of sublimation according to Hartmann? In what sense is neutralization a broader concept than sublimation? What are the opposites of neutralization and sublimation? What is the difference between stable and ad hoc neutralization?
- (2) How does Kris's conception of sublimation and neutralization differ

from Hartmann's? What are the concepts reservoir and flux? How does Kris characterize the difference between Anne and Evelyne metapsychologically?

- (3) What are Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein's central psychosocial concepts and their metapsychological implications? In what points do they agree and in which do they disagree with Erikson's--in regard to the significance of social reality? What view of reality do they imply?
- (4) What are the various metapsychological implications of the reality principle according to Hartmann? What is testing of internal reality? The double meaning of "reality-syntonic" and the consequences of the varieties of adaptation? Autonomy from environment.
- (5) What is Loewald's view of reality and what is Hartmann's critique of it? What are the implications of Loewald's paper for self, activity-passivity, and for defense?
- (6) What, according to Hartmann, is the metapsychological explanation of schizophrenia? The relation between inner and outer reality and their testing? The predisposition to schizophrenia.
- (7) What is Eissler's conception of schizophrenic ego defect? What are his implications for the theory of reality and for the autonomy of the ego? What is "systemic cathexis"?

- Rapaport: First, why is sublimation pertinent to the problem of reality? Did you find the passages in Hartmann which tell you that? Or in Kris?
- Schafer: Hartmann has a statement on neutralization in relation to the problem of reality which I think would be relevant. P. 24 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10):  
 "From what I said, it already clearly appears that neutralization (the change of the purely instinctual strivings into a mode of energy more appropriate to the functions of the ego, together with the delay of immediate instinctual discharge, the control by the ego) plays a decisive part in the mastery of reality. The formation of constant and independent objects, the institution of the reality principle, with all its aspects, thinking, action, intentionality all depend on neutralization."
- Rapaport: How would you summarize this passage, Roy? What kind of relation of neutralization or sublimation to reality does he propose here?
- Schafer: He says it plays a decisive part in the mastery of reality, but actually mastery has certain connotations which don't exactly take everything into account. It actually plays a part in the perception and organization of reality--if you want to put that under mastery--I don't know if it would fall there. I mean, for example, the formation of the concept object is a perceptual attainment too.
- Rapaport: Very good. What would be the alternative concept to mastery of reality? You say that this is not good. How would you express the alternative concept? Please watch. We are in the very midst of all the issues we will encounter concerning Hartmann, Erikson, and all the rest.
- Miller: The alternative concept is adaptation.
- Rapaport: Would that be sufficient?
- Miller: Adaptation in Hartmann's sense that includes not only adjustment to but action in.
- Rapaport: Would you accept that, Roy? If instead of mastery he had said that neutralization plays a decisive part in the adaptedness and adaptation to reality, would that be acceptable?
- Schafer: My disturbance was that I was trying to think of concepts closer to the phenomena, things like differentiation and organization--well, in a way, structuralization of reality...

- Rapaport: But you see, when you say structuralization you include both those things which are called mastery and those things which are adaptedness and adaptation.
- Plunkett: The idea of mastery of reality seems to imply that reality is a sort of hostile force that has to be mastered or controlled or dealt with--
- Rapaport: Where did you introduce the "hostile" from, do you know? It must be cryptomnesia, you know.
- Miller: Loewald mentions it.
- Rapaport: Absolutely. So you see how the camps are arraigned, though let's not get the idea that Loewald is just one camp. I wish we could have discussed Loewald's therapy paper, where he rises clearly if anything to the other camp. But we have an opportunity to show even in this paper of his that that isn't a simple camp. Nor is Hartmann one camp. But we have to make clear one tendency from which they don't liberate themselves. What is this issue? One conception is that neutralization plays a crucial role in the mastery of reality, which appears therefore as something alien, if not hostile. The other is that neutralization plays a crucial role in the adaptedness and adaptation relationships, and then the spelling out how. What is the difference between the two conceptions?
- Plunkett: The id-concept is a conflict-concept, of the clash of the environment--
- Rapaport: And the other?
- Plunkett: Has more to do with the preadaptedness of the given more positive, constructive relationship to reality.
- Rapaport: Where did you take that "positive" from? Or if it will help, "positive attitude to reality"?
- Several: Erikson.
- Rapaport: That's also very good. Erikson should be brought in here, because indeed Hartmann and Erikson both have this concept. But where does the term in our reading now come from? "Notes on the Reality Principle," Hartmann. Remember to whom he refers it? Psa. Study Child, Vol. 11, p. 35.
- Plunkett: He refers to a paper by Charlotte Buehler, where she speaks of "primary positive responses," and also to Spitz and Erikson--  
 "...the first 'positive' attitudes of the infant to the world outside."

- Rapaport: It is clear that we have the discussion of positive attitudes which psychoanalysis did not usually consider in the past, but which Hartmann and Erikson both, since the late '30's, have been stressing intensively. So we begin to see that there are two camps here, or two ways of looking at things. We will return to these. Let's go back to "Notes on the Theory of Sublimation" and have a few other references on why sublimation is pertinent to the problem of reality.
- Miller: There's a somewhat different sort on the first couple of pages of the paper. P. 9 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10):  
 "When first used by Freud, 'sublimation' referred to certain cultural or otherwise highly valued achievements and to their derivation from instinctual, which meant at the time sexual, sources."  
 That is, that sublimation is defined in relation to reality.
- Rapaport: Correct. Even though to a very narrow segment, to begin with. There are several other references that are very important.
- Miller: The same point on the next page, about socially or culturally acceptable aims.
- Rapaport: He quotes Jones about  
 "...sublimation" as the deus ex machina in all social and idealistic impulses."  
 And then  
 "The most common definition refers to sublimation"--
- Miller: --"as a deflection of the sexual drives from instinctual aims to aims which are socially or culturally more acceptable or valued."
- Rapaport: What does this mean really? What role did sublimation play in the early theory?
- White: Well, it was viewed as sort of the most respectable of the defense mechanisms, in terms of being socially most useful.
- Rapaport: That's true, but one could make it broader.
- Gilmore: Emphasis on inhibition of aim.
- Rapaport: Yes, but what did that mean in terms of reality?
- Miller: One thing it implies is a reality which is hostile to unsublimated instinctual expression.
- Rapaport: As a matter of fact, you could go so far as to say that for a psychic apparatus defined in instinctual terms, the concept of

sublimation nearly had a monopoly as to its reality-relationships. This is exaggerated a little, not too much.

Schafer: It was a way of getting off the spot that the seething cauldron conception has, the question of how these instinct-ridden people could live socialized lives.

Rapaport: Right. So sublimation is relevant to a section on reality. Let's have only a few more references. How about Kris. For instance, p. 45 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10):

"The study of two interacting processes, of maturation and adaptive patterning"--

Adaptive, you notice--

--"in response to the mother's ministrations,"

--a reality relationship--

--"might enable us to approach the question of how specific types and modalities of maternal care"--

--specific reality relationships--

--"can be related to the development of the capacity for neutralization of instinctive energy in the child."

We should also take, in Hartmann, p. 25 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10), the continuation of the point Roy teed off with.

"Besides reality testing and the mechanisms of adaptation, the integrating (or synthetic, or organizing) functions share in the maintenance of self-preservation and they too are not purely instinctual in character but mostly belong to those that work with neutralized energy,"--

White: There's an even broader statement on p. 16.

"That all ego functions are fed by desexualized or sublimated energy (later we will say: by neutralized energy), is indeed only the last touch Freud gave his gradually evolving ideas on the ego..."

Rapaport: Yes. If we substitute for "ego" the expression "the organ of adaptation," then this clearly also brings it in this scope. There is only one more segment of problems that we have to touch on if we want to see clearly why neutralization or sublimation is closely related to the problem of reality. Namely, how does sublimation come about? What do we read on that? According to Freud, as stated here.

Plunkett: P. 15, Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10:

"The process of sublimation can be linked with several mechanisms, of which displacement is only one. I just mention identification, whose

importance in this respect has often been emphasized by Freud and many others. Even more important, the correlation between change of mode"--

- Rapaport: I think that's enough. This is linked to identification. Where does he speak on the topic again? Do you recall where Freud says that sublimations are made by identifications?
- Miller: It sounds like The Ego and the Id.
- Rapaport: That's right: The Ego and the Id. How does the reasoning go? The object was first of all external and was libidinally cathected. Now the object was lost, was introjected, set up as a structure inside the ego. The original cathexis became ego-energy. And this is the energy which Freud at that point assumed to be delibidinized, desexualized energy, which was later on used as neutral energy which could be shifted from one impulse to another to reinforce them--weaken one, reinforce the other. In other words, this energy was used for hypercathexis. Or it was used as the energy of ego-interests which executed the ego-syntonic drive-impulses. Such energy was used at the points where ego-interests and drive-impulses coincide.
- Plunkett: I'm jumping the gun here, but this goes back to Hartmann's concept of reservoir.
- Rapaport: Yes. That's where the reservoir conception really comes from. Let's hope that we will get to that, but first let us just clarify a little bit why identification makes it clear that sublimation pertains to reality issues.
- White: Genetically, you've got to have somebody in reality with whom to identify, and adaptively--
- Schafer: There has to be an object.
- White: ...and adaptively, the identifications are that out of which the capacity then to act in reality is built.
- Rapaport: Controls, which make behavior more reality-syntonic, are based on that. That's correct.
- All right, let's see the second question. What are the two characteristics of sublimation according to Hartmann?
- Miller: One of them is the change in mode of energy, that Hartmann mentions on p. 15 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10):  
 "...sublimation...refers to a psychological process, this process being a change in the



mode of energy, away from an instinctual and toward a noninstinctual mode."

The other one is change of aim, p. 15:

"...not only the aims are (usually) changed in sublimation, but also the mode of the cathexis is."

- Rapaport: By the way, you probably will recognize that in some of the stuff Roy, Gill, and I wrote together we referred to this change of aim as energy divested of the earmarks of its instinctual origin. In dealing with such issues as digit-span and other issues of attention, this kind of thing is forced on one with all the power of empirical evidence. But you know, all the power of empirical evidence is worth just not even a dime if the theoretical assumptions, which belong primarily to Freud, and Hartmann, and Erikson, are not there.
- Miller: You said, "energy divested of the earmarks of its instinctual origin" in relation to change of aim. That sounds to me as if it's in relation to change in mode.
- Rapaport: Did I say "change in aim"? I am sorry, I meant change in mode. You know, "aim" always balls me up, because, you know, I don't believe in those aims. Aim is a very bad concept; it is a question of the object, really, rather than the aim.
- Schafer: The aim is always the same, according to the pleasure principle.
- Rapaport: The aim is discharge, dictated always by the pleasure principle. However, this is limited by the considerations Hartmann advances in the reality paper. Okay. So this is one of them: the change in the mode of the energy, which is called by Hartmann what?
- Plunkett: Neutralization.
- Rapaport: Neutralization. What about the other?
- Miller: The other one is the change of--forgive the expression--aim.
- Rapaport: Yes. That is the other one. Now let's take the third question in (1) in the syllabus. In what sense is neutralization a broader concept than sublimation, according to Hartmann? Where do you have those passages?
- Gilmore: Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10, p. 16:  
 "If we agree with Freud's later proposition, we will tend to see in sublimation not a more or less occasional happening but rather a continuous process, which, of course, does not exclude temporary increases or decreases in sublimatory

activities. This hypothesis will, of course, also be one more reason for us, and a decisive one, not to limit any longer the study of sublimation to culturally or socially valuable achievements only. The earlier definition poses an essential difference between some striking sublimatory achievements and other, less obvious ones, though the fundamental psychological process, we want to define, is probably the same in both cases; and, continuing this trend of thought, we cannot attribute, as was done in the past, the 'capacity for sublimation' to 'the few' only."

- Rapaport: In what sense then is the concept of neutralization broader than sublimation?
- White: Would a specific example be a person reared in a criminal slum area where he may get to be a very skilled criminal as a way of, in a sense, sublimating infantile impulses--but that's not quite a socially acceptable transaction.
- Rapaport: There are many artistic features to being a good criminal, many codes about it, many sublimatory achievements--achievements of neutralization, in this sense. Meaning that not only the valuable and not only the exceptional individual artist sublimates or neutralizes, but everybody does. Is it clear then why I pick this as the first point; in what sense the Hartmann conception is broader than the original conception? Or neutralization is broader than sublimation?
- Miller: In relation to the earlier conception, in terms of the culturally valued and so on, yes.
- White: There's another point.
- Rapaport: This is a double point: not only the culturally valued, but more; not only the culturally outstanding achievement and the culturally outstandingly achieving individual, but something that includes all of us.
- Schafer: The entire process of personality-development is what he needs the term "neutralization" for.
- Rapaport: So it is a much broader concept. Now you had a proposal, Dr. White.
- White: I think that's probably what Stuart was talking about; conceptually there's a difference in the energies that are being altered--on p. 18 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10) Hartmann says:  
"We call neutralization the change of both

libidinal and aggressive energy away from the instinctual and toward a noninstinctual mode." The original Freudian concept was limited to the libidinal.

Rapaport: Very good. Now continue, please.

White: "We may continue to speak of sublimation only in the case where neutralization of libido is involved, because this is the way it was meant by Freud and is still dominant in analytic literature. One may also use the word sublimation for the desinstinctualization of both aggression and libido, making it a synonym of neutralization (Menninger, 1942). An alternative suggestion (Kris, 1952) would reserve the term for the change of aims, often associated with neutralization."

Rapaport: So this is desinstinctualization, and not delibidinization only. This is then clearly the second point in which neutralization is a broader concept. Any more?

Schafer: The concept of neutralization allows for--or at least was developed with the idea of--there being gradations, whereas sublimation tends to be all or none--

Rapaport: Tended to be, though people would say at times that this or that was not so sublimated or was again sexualized. Could you give the passages?

Schafer: Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10, p. 19:  
 "But this is not just an either-or question. I think it comes closer to observable facts to speak, as I suggested, not just of two modes of energy of each drive: instinctual or neutralized. Both clinical experience and theory point to the probability that there exists a continuum of gradations of energy, from the fully instinctual to the fully neutralized mode..."  
 Then later on the same page:  
 "That changes in the degree of neutralization do not without exception coincide with a change of the aims, I have mentioned before in discussing sexualization..."

Rapaport: So is the third point in which neutralization is broader than sublimation clear? The first was generalization from social valuation to all personality-development. The second was--

Schafer: Taking in aggression.

- Rapaport: The third was--
- Schafer: Degrees.
- Rapaport: Introducing degrees. So you have the three generalities. But this last one is a statement on Kris. On the earlier page he quoted Kris saying that he would want to reserve--what?
- Plunkett: Sublimation for change of aim, and neutralization for change in mode.
- Rapaport: Yes. What does Hartmann say? ... Roy just read it.
- Plunkett: He says you get changes in mode which don't necessarily coincide with any change of aims.
- Rapaport: So what does he say to Kris? What stand does Hartmann take on the Kris formulation?
- Schafer: He says that change of aims is too narrow a view of it.
- Rapaport: That's on the one hand. That neutralization is more than just change of aims. But what does he say to Kris's proposition which says that you should take the change of aim, which is the narrower, and call that sublimation?
- Plunkett: Isn't he saying that you don't get the change in aim without a change in mode?
- Schafer: He says they may not coincide.
- Rapaport: They may not coincide. You can have them either way. So what does he say to Kris? Is Kris's point of importance to Hartmann or not, in relation to neutralization and sublimation?
- Plunkett: No. It's very unimportant to him.
- Rapaport: He really takes the attitude that the change of aim is a subordinate problem in this respect, as though he were saying that this is purely a content problem, to be treated under displacement, under defenses, under neutralization, to be treated variously; but that it is not important enough for a special category.

There are here two different views concerning the nature of art. Kris feels that he is forced by the assumptions concerning the nature of art to maintain a special category for change of aim, as Freud did--aim-inhibited impulses. (Do you know where Freud carries that further, the discussion of aim-inhibited impulses? It's in Civilization and Its Discontents.) Hartmann appears to

say, "Well, I don't know. Maybe art wants something like this, but I doubt it." This is the air about this. It's very important to see this clearly, that Kris seems to have an ex parte reason to maintain that, and that Hartmann does not pay attention to it.

Plunkett: Isn't there one more point here about the broader concept of neutralization in his statement giving neutralization a central position in the build-up of the ego? That certainly makes this a much broader concept than sublimation.

Rapaport: Yes, but that was subsumed under the first point as Roy formulated it.

Miller: In the schizophrenia paper, on p. 187 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 8) he says:

"I am speaking of neutralization and not of sublimation, because this impairment also involves the transformations of aggressive energy which I shall discuss later; but the term neutralization is also wider in another respect. It not only refers to occasional energy transformations in certain conflict or danger situations. It comprehends likewise the probably continuous process by which instinctual energy is modified and placed in the service of the ego. Furthermore, in its secondary processes-- and dispositions to secondary-process functions-- the ego builds up a reservoir of neutralized energy and energetic interchange takes place among the various aspects of ego activities..."

This brings a lot of this together into one--

Rapaport: Yes. This is the difference between the stable and ad hoc neutralizations which I wanted to mention. This is an excellent quotation. Let's finish this off now, as long as we are at it: where do you find in this paper ("Sublimation") a statement on stable and ad hoc neutralizations?

Gilmore: P. 20:

"Once the ego has accumulated a reservoir of neutralized energy of its own, it will--in interaction with the outer and the inner world --develop aims and functions whose cathexis can be derived from this reservoir, which means that they have not always to depend on ad hoc neutralizations."

Rapaport: Do you see the point? There is a footnote to this point, which should be linked up to this discussion of aim. Hartmann considers aims not relevant, because once the neutralized energy

reservoir is present, the ego as an autonomous apparatus creates new aims. It is not simply a change of aim, but a new set of aims.

By the way, in a private conversation Hartmann will say about the autonomy paper (just like Bruno Bettelheim, who comes to the same conclusion on quite different grounds): "Look, that's all fine, but our real problem is not freedom from what, but freedom for what. All right, we understand relative autonomy from the environment, relative autonomy from the id. You ride them. Why do you ride them? The question is, to what does the ego become free?" That is spelled out here, in this passage and in the footnote. My answer is simply that I meant to write an elementary text. I didn't shoot that high.

Do you see the connections here clearly? Here it is spelled out why he disregards the Kris proposition. In other words, it is as though he were saying that Kris is still sticking to the aim-change in terms of the seething cauldron, while he structuralizes the aim-change. Once a structuralized reservoir is created, out of that all kinds of aims can be produced.

Now, how does Kris answer this point?

Plunkett:

Flux.

Rapaport:

With the flux. So the truth--whatever that is--is not so simple. He points out that if you think in terms of flux, you think in terms of the seething cauldron, if you specify aim-change specifically. You notice that Hartmann here is on the structural side, on the adaptedness-adaptation side, while Kris finds himself on the other side. It is a fascinating game. But it is not that somebody is right or wrong, or that people are fighting. People are trying to clarify, and it is a damned hard thing to clarify.

White:

On this "from what--for what" point, there's an Eriksonian point that bears on it; that to be for something you've got to be against something.

Rapaport:

Partly that, partly the whole business that once a problem is solved, new problems are encountered and new autonomous ways are available to the ego. Let's take the reservoir and flux; who wants to show us where that is, in Kris?

Plunkett:

P. 32, Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10:

"It may be useful to distinguish between 'the permanent or relatively permanent investment of the ego with neutralized aggressive or libidinous energies' on which secondary autonomy in ego

functions mainly depends, and 'the energy flux, i.e., transitory changes in energy distribution and redistribution such as the temporary and shifting reinforcement of sexual, aggressive and neutral energy as may occur in the course of any type of activity' (Kris, 1952, p. 27). The first, the permanent investment of the ego, represents what Hartmann (1955) describes as the reservoir; the second, the transitory changes in energy distribution and redistribution, the flux, represents instinctual energy which may or may not be added. The capacity to neutralize can then be viewed as determined by both the reservoir and the flux."

- Rapaport: Can somebody elaborate why the capacity to neutralize would depend on the reservoir, and why it would depend on the flux?
- Miller: Neutralization is carried out by the ego, and the energies which are available to the ego are those of the reservoir, primarily.
- Rapaport: So what would the ego do in order to neutralize? What would it use the reservoir for?
- White: Structure, structuralization. It says here, "permanent or relatively permanent investment," referring to a relatively permanent equilibrium or energy-distribution, which is a structure.
- Rapaport: How would you neutralize further?
- White: The transformation of the unneutralized energies by means of this structure leads to more distant derivatives.
- Rapaport: True, if this reservoir of neutralized energy is used to reinforce already-existing structures, then you have further neutralization of the impulses that impinge on the ego. That's right. But it will be used also for building new structures--sometimes momentary structures, sometimes permanent structures, which further neutralize.
- Miller: What's a momentary structure?
- Rapaport: When, under the pressure of an impulse, you do not simply execute it, but find a new way to channel it, you create a momentary structure. Many creative momentary ideas are of this sort. When, for instance, you highlight, with a quick joke, a situation which otherwise makes you full of asperity, that's a momentary structure.
- This brings us to the issue of flux. How does the flux contribute to neutralization?

- White: Well, in a way the flux is that from which such temporary structures would be built.
- Rapaport: It is because of the flux that this neutralized energy does not once and forever decide the ego-interests. It produces the ego-interests under the influence of the flux; the flux again and again provides it with energy that it is capable of neutralizing to a greater or lesser degree. And the more often you go at it, the more easily the neutralization will occur and the more extensive it will be--these are the senses in which flux and reservoir contribute to the neutralization.
- Plunkett: Flux refers then not only to the redistribution of already neutralized energy, but also to unneutralized energy, sexual and aggressive.
- Rapaport: It refers to those and also to the denaturalization of already neutralized energy. So the flux consists of at least three different elements: the denaturalizations, the unneutralized or relatively unneutralized energy of the impinging impulse, and the degree to which the neutralization of the energy of the impinging impulse is further enhanced. It's a complex concept, as I gather it.
- Schafer: He says the flux represents instinctual energy which may or may not be added.
- Rapaport: Yes, but watch what we are coming to; you will see that the flux also extends to the reservoir.
- Plunkett: He says that. Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10, p. 32:  
 "...the energy flux, i.e., transitory changes in energy distribution and redistribution such as the temporary and shifting reinforcement of sexual and aggressive and neutral energy,"--  
 which I think already brings in the reservoir here, when he's talking about neutral energy; it's already neutralized.
- Rapaport: Would you agree that he does not conceive of the reservoir as anything too fixed, while Hartmann would rather be inclined to that?
- Plunkett: Hartmann talks about the reservoir on p. 20, Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10:  
 "Once the ego has accumulated a reservoir of neutralized energy of its own..."  
 He seems to make this quite a distinct entity, much more so than Kris does here.
- Rapaport: That's right. But in "Notes on the Reality Principle" you



will see that deneutralization is one of the functions of this already neutralized cathectic amount which is the reservoir. At times it is absolutely necessary to deneutralize; this is that business about regression in the service of the ego.

You know, when you study psychoanalysis and the case that you are controlling is one in which defensive maneuvers are in the forefront for a long while, your supervisor is probably going to warn you that it is your job somehow to get this patient anxious, because the analysis needs the motivation provided by anxiety, and the information and indications provided to you and to the patient. What you are striving toward there is really deneutralization. Or when Gill says that the job of therapy is to create a regressive situation (you call it transference neurosis), to elicit the affects in their original strength-- That is in what form, according to Schur?

Schafer: Resomatized.

Rapaport: Resomatized form. Resomatization and deneutralization are here not identical, because deneutralization is a far broader concept than resomatization. I'm just trying to connect the concepts for you.

Another related one is Eissler's. Eissler speaks about systemic cathexis, which is a very weak way--a misunderstandable way-- of coming to this same point of reservoir. It is also a very weak--but insightful and clinical--way of coming to the problem which we discussed in connection with identifications vs. object-representations. Remember, identifications enter the structure of the system ego, and cathexes of it are systemic cathexes; while the objects which become object-representations do not carry the systemic cathexis. We have discussed this so much-- Klein, Jacobson, all through that line. I am again just trying to make a cross-cut so that you see systematic relationships.

Schafer: The concept of systemic cathexis sounds related to a distinction Hartmann makes between sublimation as regards ego-functions and sublimation as regards ego-aims and objects. Eissler seems to be talking about the investment of ego-functions.

Rapaport: That's right. I appreciate your bringing it up. This is the same difference again, between cathecting an object and cathecting a function; and this function is always the function of a structure, a function of that system which executes it. So you see, this problem which we encountered in connection with identification vs. object-representation goes throughout the theoretical problem-world with which we are dealing. If we had time, we would have come to this in connection with comparing Eissler and Hartmann; but at least we get a taste of it. For

instance, the relationship of a man to a woman, or vice versa, can be altogether utilitarian as to aim, even though the cathexis is libidinal. On the other hand, the relationship may be one of friendship, with altogether neutralized energy involved in it, and yet the aim may become sexual. These are very great differences.

Take for instance a man like a case we saw here recently. In him the fundamental driving forces are libidinal derivatives, no question about it, but the ego-aims are not at all that. The ego-aims are exploitative and of the service sort. You know of the kind of man who feels that he has to serve the woman by healing her with his genital activities, bettering her, helping her, ennobling her, satisfying her--service. A service station, a gas pump. You see the distinctions.

I would like to see the Evelyne-Anne comparison, please.

Miller: Kris, p. 42, Psa. Study Child, Vol. 10. The most summary part: "In Evelyne the capacity to neutralize was early developed, in Anne this general capacity did not reach a comparable state"--

Rapaport: Can somebody tell us how we know that in Evelyne the capacity to neutralize was early developed, while in Anne it did not reach a comparable stage? What do we know about Anne? She was what kind of child?

Miller: Originally active, and then she went through a kind of Spitz-like decline.

Rapaport: Yes. Spitz-like decline is the crucial passage. P. 41: "...between six months and twelve months resembled...children in institutions." In turn, what about Evelyne, what did she do?

Plunkett: She's described as independent, energetic.

Rapaport: Highly advanced from the beginning on, with unusual degrees of skill throughout, the ability to stand up to the mother throughout the whole development, locked in a bowel-training fight. We see her as a human being capable of really relating to realities. This is the inference then.

Schafer: There's a sharp nutriment contrast in the earliest phases of their development, in the active stimulation of Evelyne's mind from the very beginning, whereas Anne's mother came to it only later, as a substitute career.

Rapaport: Excellent. Let's have the next point.

- Miller: P. 42:  
 "Most areas of her behavior were free from instinctual outbreaks, but in none was neutralization carried as far as with Evelyne. While Evelyne soiled at two and a half, in those activities in which neutralization had been achieved the degree of neutralization seemed extraordinary. It is a difference which, I believe, can be well expressed in terms of the 'reservoir' and the 'flux.'"
- Rapaport: Meaning what does he treat as flux in Evelyne?
- Schafer: Flux was the soiling.
- Rapaport: The soiling, the stubborn, aggressive battle--that was flux. What else was flux in Evelyne? What brings Evelyne into this paper?
- Miller: The way she dealt with the fright she had.
- Rapaport: That's right. The fright was tremendous, and there was a real flux suddenly, an overwhelming one. And what proves that there was a high reservoir?
- Plunkett: The manner in which she dealt with this, by constructing it in a drawing.
- Rapaport: What is the concept that describes that precisely?
- Schafer: Active mastery of that which was passively experienced.
- Rapaport: That's right. He even says so. Where? I want you to see that I am not introducing activity-passivity simply out of my own interest in it.
- Miller: P. 39:  
 "The active repetition of the passively experienced terror is here not entrusted to play. Evelyne can represent what she wants, and she wants to represent what frightened her."
- Rapaport: You see, not only does she turn it into activity, but she turns it into representative activity.
- Schafer: P. 39:  
 "Active repetition is entrusted to a higher level of imagination and action."  
 That seems important, because there are much more primitive levels of activity replacing passivity.

- Rapaport: The most primitive level is obviously the kind of thing that happens in--?
- Schafer: Identification with the aggressor, for instance. If she started to frighten other children--
- Rapaport: Yes, that's a very primitive level, but there is a still more primitive level. Where was this conception introduced by Freud?
- Plunkett: Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The traumatic neurosis and the repetitive dream--
- Rapaport: That's right. The most primitive is simply the being overwhelmed and not being able to help but repeat it. There the active repetition becomes active in relation to the impulse, but passive in relation to the environment. Such activity can be a full surrender to the environment, as in the repetitive dreams of the traumatic neurosis.
- This kind of independent corroboration gives the activity-passivity concept a similar status, in a way, to that of the concept of stimulus-nutrient. It is not certain that by simplicity or by effectiveness it is here to stay, but this kind of thing shows it.
- So we see that in Evelyne a high degree of neutralization is achieved, and that is not possible without a great reserve. At the very point at which the flux is seen, the manner of coping with it indicates a high degree of neutralization, and that can be reconstructed as a proof that the reservoir was great. Now let's read on.
- Miller: P. 42:  
 "We may assume that in Evelyne the permanent investment of the ego is far advanced, but the flux is left relatively free. In Anne the flux is well controlled, but the degree of neutralization is not comparable; "--
- Rapaport: How do we know that in Anne the flux is well controlled?
- Miller: She becomes such a well-behaved, nice-nice little girl.
- Plunkett: Under the impact of the sibling she doesn't regress; she doesn't come up with soiling or other openly instinctual representations of this. She focuses on the mother's emphasis on intellectual achievement, upon teaching; this is the area in which she chooses to frustrate the mother.
- Rapaport: And how does it show up?

- Schafer: In the handling of books and speech.
- Rapaport: That which is already neutralized is lost. What impinges she still copes with, but at the cost of losing the already acquired. How does that show up? What does she do?
- Miller: Pp. 41-42:  
 "[Her] speech became excited and somewhat more infantile, its use defensive. At the same time her handling of books changed in character: she would anxiously go from one picture to the other in restless search for what she needed."
- Rapaport: What is the character then of the handling of the books and the language?
- Miller: It's regressive.
- Rapaport: Yes; but what characterizes it positively?
- White: It's drive-determined.
- Rapaport: Yes. Specifically?
- Schafer: It's aggressive, primarily.
- Rapaport: It is partly aggressive. But what is its character qua behavior and thought?
- White: It's impulsive, unplanned.
- Rapaport: Impulsive: how do you express this metapsychologically?
- White: No delay.
- Rapaport: How do you express that metapsychologically?
- Miller: Primary process.
- Rapaport: Primary-process character. This is the point. One child reacts by making what was already neutralized into something of primary-process character. The other reacts by using the secondary process to the hilt, to a top achievement. This is the contrast.
- Schafer: But why aren't both cases considered flux? I mean, Anne's impairment comes in a different area.
- Rapaport: But you see, the flux is the exacerbation of the impingement of the instinctual impulse itself. That is allowed to work in Evelyne: she soils, she is stubborn, this girl. At the

same time, that which should work autonomously, secondary-process-wise, is enhanced in her, while it is reduced in Anne.

Schafer: Advanced impairment is described as primary process. That means, it seems to me, inevitably that--while perhaps not so directly as in the case of Evelyne--there is more instinctual discharge taking place.

Rapaport: Let me give an example. A person goes to a meeting and meets with people with whom he has to discuss a paper in public. And what these people stand for is terribly irritating, appeals to all the aggressions of the man. He can do one of two things--or rather, many things, but one of two extremes. He can control his aggressions and muddle up his thought, or he can come out straight with his aggressions and in the meanwhile remain clear about what he has to say. Very frequently the latter solution is biphasic; at the price of aggressing, afterwards you can state it clearly. But the first one is incapable of the biphasic character, incapable of expressing either the aggression or the thought. Now surely there are also people who can only aggress and can't go on with their thoughts. That means that the flux is not controlled and neutralization is weak. The reservoir is weak.

I am not asserting that one could not give a different interpretation to Kris's material. Evelyne and Anne are after all illustrations. He uses them to establish a concept. It is his sovereign right to assure us that this is how it was, or else it would have been his sovereign right to create an imaginary example and illustrate this idea with that. That is not in question.

Now let's skip question #3 and go to #4. First, let's put the question more generally. What are the outstanding meanings of the reality principle, according to Hartmann? We mean two things by it, he says. What are they? What are the two senses in which the term reality principle is used?

Schafer: He discusses the reality principle in terms of its opposition to the pleasure principle; and also in the context of adaptation, as its being a further development of the pleasure principle, in a certain way.

Rapaport: Its reference to reality, simply. Where is the passage? This is the first distinction he makes, the first new thing he introduces.

Miller: Psa. Study Child, Vol. 11, p. 33:  
 "In our literature, two meanings are currently attached to the term reality principle. Used in

one sense, it indicates a tendency to take into account in an adaptive way, in perception, thinking and action, whatever we consider the 'real' features of an object or a situation. But in another, maybe we could say, narrower sense, we refer primarily to the case in which it represents a tendency to wrest our activities from the immediate need for discharge inherent in the pleasure principle."

Rapaport: This is a reality principle related to which of the two camps we talked about?

Several: The hostile reality.

Rapaport: The hostile reality. This goes through all these papers. What is his criticism? It follows immediately afterwards. P. 33:

"This poses a problem. One cannot state in a general way that reality-syntonic behavior curtails pleasure."

Schafer: He has a statement on p. 38 where he says this concisely.

"To avoid a possible misunderstanding I may repeat: it is, of course, not the essential characteristics of the pleasure-unpleasure principle, by which we define it (that is the striving for pleasure and avoiding of unpleasure) that change in the course of development; what does change are the conditions of pleasure and unpleasure."

Rapaport: "What does change are the conditions of pleasure and unpleasure."

Can you explain what that means?

Plunkett: This comes back, I thought, to what we were talking about last time, that "for whom," from the structural standpoint, depends on whether you're talking about ego, superego, or id.

Rapaport: Can you find the reference to that point?

Schafer: P. 36:

"If we look at it from a point at which structuralization has actually taken place, we have the right to draw from this finding two conclusions. The reality principle, in the narrower sense, imposes restrictions on the pleasure principle, if only to secure a future pleasure gain. But the aspect of structure formation

under scrutiny now has changed also the conditions for pleasure gain;"--

Rapaport: Meaning structure-formation changes the conditions of pleasure-need. Do you know where this goes back to in Freud? In "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" he for the first time unites two considerations: the subjective nature of the definition of pleasure-pain principle and the tension-increase-tension-decrease conception of it. But he says that the relationships are very complex here and we do not know, we have to keep all this tentative. Where does that point come up in Hartmann here, the subjective character of pleasure-unpleasure and the tension relationships?

Suttenfield: There's a reference to it on p. 38:  
 "In those situations in which pleasure in one system (id) would induce unpleasure in another one (ego), the child learns to use the danger signal (a dose of unpleasure) to mobilize the pleasure principle and in"--

Rapaport: Very good; that's the point made last time by Miller and today by Plunkett, referring to Miller. But there is a more specific point on this tension-pleasure relationship.

Miller: P. 37:  
 "...we are impressed by the tenacity with which man so often clings to the sources of experienced pleasure. But there is no denying that a reassessment of pleasure values does take place, a differentiation according to their various sources, which one may well describe as a modification of the pleasure principle, or perhaps as a partial domestication of the pleasure principle..."

Rapaport: Yes, one could take that. There is an even better reference at the bottom of the page:

"It would be especially hard on the basis of Freud's earlier theory which established a direct coordination of the feelings of the pleasure-unpleasure series with the lowering or heightening of the stimulus tension in the mind. : Later, he said that this view could not be correct."

--That was said in Beyond the Pleasure Principle--

"He thought rather that pleasure and unpleasure could be referred to peculiarities like 'something rhythmic, the periodical duration of the changes, the risings and fallings of the volume of stimuli.'" "



This is the point where Jacobson took off. We could say that decreasing tension corresponds originally to pleasure while increasing tension corresponds to pain or displeasure, and that with the structural complications introduced (as we quoted them from p. 36), the subjective pleasure-conditions change. We reconstruct this original pleasure-condition only theoretically --that's only a model for us--and keep the pleasure-pain principle or pleasure-unpleasure principle as an abstraction.

But at any rate, we are still on this first point in question #4 in the syllabus, that there are two meanings to the reality principle. What other new light does Hartmann shed on the issue of reality principle?

White:

I think on p. 50 one aspect of this is clarified.

"In the foregoing, I have repeatedly referred to inner as against outer reality. I have now to make clear that inner reality is not quite the same thing which Freud had in mind in speaking of 'psychic reality,' a concept he used in his explanation that fantasy activities can have the same motivating power as realistic behavior, and that in parts of our mental apparatus reality testing does not exist. In speaking here of 'inner reality,' I am referring to the fact that in a sense all mental functions, tendencies, contents are 'real'; fantasy activity also is real, though not realistic. That is, to recognize that a fantasy is, as a mental act, real does not mean that its contents reproduce reality."

Rapaport:

But what then is the internal testing of reality? ...

Miller:

P. 51:

"To speak only of one later developmental phase, it seems certain that after a given age the child learns, in his successful dealings with external reality, to include in his plans of action the consideration also of his own mental processes.... About the distorted pictures of inner reality, about typical and individual self-deception, we have learned more from analytic work than from any other source. To account for it, it seems reasonable to speak of a testing of the within, in addition to the testing of the without--that is, to distinguish inner reality testing from outer reality testing. Impediments of inner reality testing are so common that, as to certain functions and contents of the mind, we do not expect much objectivity even in a normal person,

except in the course of the psychoanalytic process. These impediments will, of course, sometimes also alter the picture of outer reality..."

Rapaport: Remember, at the very beginning he states that this contrary function to the pleasure principle was introduced in the service of the pleasure principle itself, while the reality-relationship, the direct relation to reality, the adaptive one, had nothing to do with that. Freud introduced it mainly in the narrower sense, in the anti-pleasure-principle sense. That was the first distinction. Now Dr. White tells us that the reality principle holds for internal reality also--not psychic reality as Freud meant it, but internal reality, the evaluation of the internal world.

But between these there are at least two more propositions that Hartmann makes about the reality principle and its application.

Plunkett: Psa. Study Child, Vol. II, p. 40:  
"The reality principle includes both knowledge of reality and acting in regard to it."

Rapaport: A crucial point. Why?

Plunkett: It distinguishes between knowing something and being able to do something about it.

Rapaport: Would you read the full quotation?

Plunkett: This is where he is talking about what is reality-syntonic.  
P. 40:

"Also, we should be mindful of the fact that if we state, let's say, that a certain thought is reality-syntonic in a given situation, this may refer to either one of two meanings. It may mean that the thought is true in the sense that it corresponds to reality. On the other hand, it may also mean that its use, in a given reality situation, leads to a successful mastery of this situation."

Rapaport: So first he introduces the distinction between the relationship to reality and the contrariness to the pleasure principle. Then he introduces the distinction that the reality principle may mean an exact, precise representation of reality in the mind --a veridical representation, the psychologists would call it, a truth-telling representation. But something that is truth-telling may not tell you how to deal with it. So a man may be called a man of good reality-testing when he can state to you a

knowledge about reality, or he may have no idea about it but still have common sense about what to do. How does he say that in French?

Schafer: "Savoir-faire."

Rapaport: "Savoir-faire, savoir-vivre, and savoir tout court."

So this is then the second consideration introduced. It is not only a question of how much the pleasure principle is negated and how much of a reality-adaptive relationship is established, but also a question of whether this is a veridical relationship to reality or an effective, pragmatic relationship to reality.

But this is only the second distinction he introduced. I will leave the one Dr. White introduced for a little bit later. There is a third distinction made by him. What is it?

Suttenfield: P. 43:

"When Freud speaks about reality testing he usually means the capacity to distinguish between ideas and perceptions. In a broader sense, reality testing also refers to the ability to discern subjective and objective elements in our judgments on reality."

Rapaport: Now tell me: how does he relate the distinction Freud made between ideas and perceptions to what we have discussed so far? Does it pertain to the first or the second of the distinctions concerning the reality principle? Remember, we have two distinctions. One was between anti-pleasure-principle vs. reality adaptation; the second was between knowing and succeeding. To which one does this pertain?

Several: The first.

Rapaport: How?

Suttenfield: This doesn't have anything to do with using what you know in order to succeed, it just has to do with the idea and the perception.

Rapaport: How does it pertain positively to the first?

White: It refers to the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment--

Rapaport: How? If the pleasure principle has--?

Plunkett: If the pleasure principle has sway, then you strive toward discharge and get hallucinatory gratification.

- Rapaport: Meaning it is an idea and not a perception. The distinction between what the pleasure principle would dictate and what reality-adaptation offers through the senses...
- Plunkett: Seeking the identity of thought, vs. the identity of perception.
- Rapaport: That's right. So in this sense the Freudian distinction pertains to the first distinction Hartmann makes. Now he introduces the capacity to distinguish between objective and subjective elements. What does that mean? What is the meaning of discerning the subjective and objective elements in our judgment of reality? What is he talking about?
- Plunkett: Being able to distinguish between what one feels to be so and what one can objectively determine to be the case.
- Rapaport: Let's have a few quotations on that.
- Miller: There's the rest of the paragraph we started with. P. 43 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 11) following the sentence about discerning  
 "...subjective and objective elements in our judgments on reality. The former we expect to function rather reliably in normal adult persons; the learning of the latter is an unending process. It is here that the criteria are, in most people, rather poorly defined and the temptations to tamper with objective judgment are considerable. There are, of course, many well-known reasons for this, but I propose to limit myself to the one point under discussion only. I mentioned the well-known fact that pleasure premia are in store for the child who conforms to the demands of reality and of socialization but they are equally available if this conforming means the acceptance by the child of erroneous and biased views which the parents hold of reality."
- Rapaport: What is implied here?
- Miller: The relativity of reality, for one thing.
- Rapaport: How does the child establish his judgments of reality?
- Miller: He borrows them.
- Rapaport: By what process?
- Several: By identification.
- Rapaport: By processes of identification. These processes of identification

obviously provide, on the side, pleasure premia. He discusses that in considerable detail on p. 39, where he speaks of "...recompense in the form of love or approval by the parents."

The pleasure from participating in the world of adults, the motivation for accepting certain-- No, there was one more thing there.

Miller: Pride in foregoing pleasure.

Rapaport: Once the superego is established, pride in foregoing the pleasure-gain. But this is a side issue for us now. The identification is the basic form of the acceptance of reality, of the effect of reality-testing. But this, as he points out, may be an objective or subjective reality. To make the judgment between these two, objective or subjective, is the first meaning of this. Let's see the latter part of the next paragraph, p. 43 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 11):

"...the formation of the superego, which of course includes, among other and partly opposite results, also some degree of narrowing or distortion of the child's knowledge of inner reality."

This applies to inner reality now too.

"We should not omit that the superego may occasionally influence even the testing of outer reality..."

Schafer: That "occasionally" seems like an understatement.

Rapaport: Yes, but the main function of the superego is in relation to inner reality, and most of the distortion occurs in the appraisal of what we did, in the tendency to find it marvelous even though it was lousy, and sometimes vice versa.

I would like to call your attention to several other passages. For instance, pp. 47-48:

"...data are assimilated in a way which gives us knowledge of the outside but which also tries to give them a meaningful place with respect to our mental functioning."

That's the assimilation.

"This is based on the structure of our mental apparatus (it certainly has a physiological aspect too), on conscious, preconscious, and unconscious previous experience, and on present mental activity also. If we speak of assimilating a part of reality, or of making it our own, this does not refer only to the knowledge of objective data; it also refers to their cathexis and integration. The difference in cathexis of

objective data and those that are also in a more personal sense part of 'our world,' I cannot discuss here. At any rate, the economic and dynamic status of knowledge is changed by this process of assimilation which introduces it into the interplay of our psychic tendencies."

Now the next paragraph:

"What is commonly called 'reality' outside science is formed, then, also by the nature of our mental apparatus in general and by our history. A constant process of taking in--assimilation--and putting out is going on in our minds. This brings us face to face with a familiar problem, rather well understood psychologically in some aspects--although other aspects raise questions which concern physiology, and a third group constitute one of the central issues of epistemology...Zilboorg (1941) states the question: what is 'external' and what is 'externalized'?"

You see, externalization never occurs without some good hook on the outside. But using the externalized instead of the external introduces the subjective reality instead of the objective. Or take the latter part of this page (pp. 48-49):

"Reality testing can then function not only in the narrower sense--the distinction between perception and idea, which is normally established rather early in life--but also in the broader sense we mentioned before. However, it does not, of course, always reach out into strictly 'objective' knowledge but mostly balances one element of the 'world of immediate experience,' in the somewhat hazy sense we use the word here, against others."

You know, Aristotle knew this. He said that you always have to make a distinction between what a thing is from our point of view and what it is according to nature. That's the kind of distinction you know exists in biology between the natural system of the plant world and the Linnaean system. This is the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. And the reality principle applies here also. Let's take some other references. For instance, you will find on p. 49:

"Here again, we see a compromise formation between two ways of dealing with reality, each one of which is in itself adaptive. The coherence of this 'world' is dependent, among others, on the ego's capacities for integration, which in dealing with outer reality at the same time consider the state of the mental systems. This is a contribution of the synthetic function to

our approach to outer and inner reality." To be able to take such a distance that one can distinguish the objective elements from these subjective, integrative elements is quite an accomplishment. And these subjective, integrative elements are some of the highest reality elements in our makeup.

Have you seen in this paper a further generalization concerning the judgment between objectivity and subjectivity? That is, is it only the synthetic functions, the internal assimilation, the integration of knowledge, that makes it subjective? Or is there something else? I would like to show that he realizes here that there is a subjectivity dependent upon society.

Schafer:

Pp. 43-44:

"There is, then, interference with objective cognizance of the world not only through the action of instinctual needs; it may be handicapped also by ego (and superego) functions, even such as in other circumstances can lead to adjustment. And, more specifically, there is the case we are discussing here, namely, the taking over by the individual of the picture of reality accepted and taught by the love objects, but also, in a broader sense, of the picture commonly accepted in the culture to which he belongs. The child learns his approach to reality in constant relation to the adult's approach to it. It adjusts to a world which is not only to a considerable extent man-made, but also man-thought. As a consequence, two different criteria of reality develop; and in the world of every individual both play a role."

Rapaport:

First of all I want you to notice that here at this level of objectivity and subjectivity there is implied that distinction which we already noted, namely, between knowledge and effectiveness. Because in a certain society objective knowledge won't make you effective.

Schafer:

He gets back here to a point which he last made emphatically in the adaptation paper.\*

Rapaport:

Correct. In 1939. He comes out very close to Erikson, but

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\*"Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem," Int. Z. Psa. Imago, 24:62-135;1939. Translated in part in Organization and Pathology of Thought, ed. D. Rapaport, New York, Columbia University Press, 1951.

where does he fall short of Erikson? He falls short of Erikson because he again assumes a duality: there is an outside social reality from which these things are taken over, as though there were an ultimate criterion of objective reality. In Erikson, even the space in which people live is a function of that unitary individual-social matrix. You remember, the Sioux's space and the Yurok's. Now please, it is not proven that Erikson's method of making science out of this is the better one, or that Hartmann's is. But they are different. And we again have this line drawn which we tried to draw before. Is reality something external, potentially hostile, or not? You see how Hartmann is walking the line, coming over to this side, going over to that side.

White: This ties in with his statement about sublimation and the problem of evaluating that in terms of social acceptability too.

Rapaport: Absolutely. And we can see that Loewald is aware of the problem too. On p. 14 ("The Ego and Reality"):

"It would be justified to look at the defensive function of the ego, seen in the light of the above considerations, from an entirely different point of view. What the ego defends itself, or the psychic apparatus, against, is not reality but the loss of reality, that is, the loss of an integration of the world such as it exists in the libidinal relationship with the mother, and with which the father seems to interfere in the Oedipus situation..."

So this hostile representation of reality tries to interfere with the unity. Turn to the next page and you will see that this man, even though he speaks in an id-language throughout, sees the problem (p. 15):

"To express it in broader terms: the original unity and identity, undifferentiated and unstructured, of psychic apparatus and environment, is as much of a danger for the ego as the demand of the 'paternal castration threat' to give it up altogether. Against the threatening possibility of remaining in or sinking back into the structureless unity from which the ego emerged, stands the powerful paternal force. With this force an early identification is attempted, an identification which precedes and prepares the Oedipus complex."

Erikson could have said it in a little bit different language, in terms of the unipolarization, fusion, the bipolarization, the emergence from it. Here it is personified: father, mother, the undifferentiated depths, and the hostile reality. Whatever the terms, though, the man really sees it all clearly. By the



way, this is the problem of the double autonomies. This man has seen the problem with which we are trying to wrestle these days with such propositions as Erikson's concerning the development, the differentiation in the course of development, epigenesis, or mine in activity-passivity or the double aspect of autonomy.

Schafer: There's a double aspect of defense in this paper.

Rapaport: Right. Now I have to cover one more point on this. When you then realize in the discussion of this objectivity-subjectivity business that the attempt to be adapted to your society may lead you to subjectivity, you are faced with the question, which is a better adaptation then? To objectivity, to the so-called objective reality-testing, or to the so-called subjective reality-testing? What is Hartmann's answer? Obviously his answer is that the question put this way is nonsense. There is no better one. But what is his positive answer? --This is a negative thing. I raised the question in a stupid way, but I don't know how to raise it otherwise. What is Hartmann's answer?

Schafer: I thought running through his discussion was the double autonomy issue.

Rapaport: It most certainly is there, particularly clearly on p. 44 (Psa. Study Child, Vol. 11):

"In our clinical evaluation of 'realistic' behavior we commonly use both concepts of knowledge; in theoretical discussions we mostly refer to the concept of 'objective knowledge.' How the relations between the two concepts of reality-knowledge or, maybe we should say, how the criteria of 'truth' about reality evolve, I cannot discuss here in detail. In his stages of rebelliousness the growing individual also rebels against the commonly accepted view of reality. His tendency toward objective knowledge may also muster the help of instinctual drives."

Do you see how it musters it?

Miller: It could help in a rebellion against the social "reality."

Rapaport: No, as a matter of fact the rebellion is the expression of the instinctual drives. That does lead him, though, to a rebellion against accepted evaluations of reality, and therefore leads him one step closer to an objective reality.

Plunkett: The autonomy from the environment.

Rapaport: To be sure. But do you see what in my paper corresponds to

this "also muster the help of instinctual drives"? Mind you, I would like to say, not to justify me or Hartmann, that these were independently arrived at; I didn't see this paper at the time when I was writing the autonomy paper last September.

Miller: Do you have in mind the point in your paper about the instinctual drives as the guarantees of autonomy?

Rapaport: Ultimately it is the instinctual drives that are the guarantee of autonomy from the environment. Moreover, what other point in the paper corresponds? That some structures are nourished by drives. And we know very well that some defenses are maintained from both sides, as Freud put it in The Problem of Anxiety. Do you see how these all tie together? There is converging evidence that the problems we are all being confronted with are somehow the same, whether it be for Loewald or Erikson or Hartmann or Kris or Gill or whomever you have. It is very important to know that it is not just harebrained hair-splitting.

But I still would like to know what Hartmann's answer is. Which is better? Which reality principle should one abide by?

Miller: Psa. Study Child, Vol. 11, p. 45:

"It is clear that not every judgment of or dealing with our fellow men calls for the same level of objective thinking. What one usually calls Menschenkenntnis"--

What does that mean?

Rapaport: Menschenkenntnis--knowledge of man. You know, that's what old Mrs. Freud spoke about when she said, "Siggie is such a good boy, but people he never understood." You know, that's authentic.

Miller: I've always been a little suspicious of that.

Rapaport: Oh, no. It's authentic. You will find it recorded by Bernfeld.

Miller: "What one usually calls Menschenkenntnis belongs to a greater part to the level of common sense."

Rapaport: Yes. Now let's look at p. 41, where he says perfectly clearly what the dope is about the relationships of these various uses of the reality principle.

Miller: P. 41:

"We have to face the fact that what is adaptive in one respect may interfere with adaptation in another."

Rapaport:

Adaptive here means, "is a correct application of one or the other reality principle." You remember, we use reality principle in two senses: one, anti-pleasure-principle, the other, adaptation and adaptedness, as Dr. Miller put it. Here he talks about this latter. It returns throughout this paper with all force, that you can't say that one is better than the other. The first point Dr. Miller made was that for different tasks different things are necessary. When you work in analysis, you react to the person on the basis of the signals you get from inside yourself, affective and ideational signals. The more automatized your scientific knowledge is, and the more it shades into your reactions, which are trained reactions, the better therapy you do. Even if you think it out clearly in advance, theoretically, you still won't dish it up; you will let it come when you feel the signal coming. Your patient is threatening you, your patient is moving you, your patient is scaring you that he is in danger; or anything like that. There is a theoretical, objective backlog in your mind, but you still will judge different situations with various degrees of subjectivity and objectivity. And whichever you do, you lose on the other end. You can say that you can't win for losing, and you can't lose for winning. Both of them are true.

This is really the portent, and this is where Hartmann is on par with the whole Erikson point, because here any objective reality divorced from us disappears. If you strive for something that is more abstract, you lose out on the subjective; this is a unity re-established, with an internal balance. It is re-established in a complex way, but a way well worth knowing.

Well, regrettable as this is, I don't see that we can get beyond this point, and this is a good point to sign off on.